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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
As the world’s largest emitters and economies, the United States and China play a critical 
role in global climate mitigation. Using Putnam’s two-level game showcases how the 
domestic political context of each country impacts their international policies. However, 
Putnam’s framework does not differentiate between bilateral and multilateral 
circumstances. The clarity and concentration of perceived costs and benefits for the 
United States and China from climate policies lead to differing outcomes on the 
multilateral and bilateral stage. Fear of the free-rider effect makes players assume payoffs 
that resemble the Prisoner’s Dilemma during multilateral climate negotiations, whereas 
bilateral negotiations usually result in more cooperative outcomes. These contrasting 
policy outcomes reflect the hot and cold relationship between the United States and 
China. The additional expediency and effectiveness of bilateral agreements suggest that 
substantial climate action will likely originate from strong bilateral agreements. In an 
optimal scenario, increased U.S.-China climate collaboration translates into a stronger 
relationship between the two global superpowers and provides other nations with the 
confidence and certainty to invest in abatement in a renewed global climate regime.   
 
 
Keywords: U.S.-China relations, climate change, multilateral climate policy, bilateral 
climate policy 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Climate change poses a large threat to the livelihood of current and future 
generations. In September 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
a United Nations-sponsored committee of scientists, reported that—with a low margin of 
uncertainty—anthropogenic sources significantly contribute to climate change.1 Human 
activities including burning fossil fuels, raising livestock, and accumulating waste in 
landfills emit greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide, and 
methane gas, which trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere.2 In the past hundred years, the 
Earth’s average temperature has increased by 0.8 degrees Celsius.3 The global 
temperature is currently rising at more than 0.1 degrees Celsius per decade, though 
climate scientists and global leaders agree that nations need to curb temperature rise to 
less than 2 degrees Celsius in order to avoid a calamitous climate shift.4  
As the Earth’s climate changes, society faces many social, environmental, and 
economic challenges. Higher levels of CO2 and particulates deteriorate air quality and 
1 Justin Gillis, “U.N. Climate Panel Endorses Ceiling on Global Emissions,” New York Times, September 
27, 2013, accessed October 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/science/global-climate-
changereport.html?pagewanted=1. 
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 
2007: Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis,” 2007, accessed on February 2, 2015, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-human-and.html. 
3 “Climate Change: Basic Information,” Environmental Protection Agency, accessed on February 3, 2015, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basics/. 
4 Patrick Lynch, “Secrets from the Past Point to Rapid Climate Change in the Future,” NASA Global 
Climate Change, December 15, 2011, accessed on April 20, 2015, http://climate.nasa.gov/news/649/. 
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negatively impact public health. Sea level rise and increased extreme weather events 
displace populations, creating millions of climate refugees.5 Higher temperatures have 
disturbed ecosystems and stunted agricultural output. In order to address climate change 
and its implications, society must collectively decrease its GHG emissions.  
The United States and China hold titles as the world’s largest economies and 
GHG emitters. Their cumulative emissions make up about half of the world’s CO2 
emissions. China surpassed the United States in CO2 emissions in 2006, though the U.S. 
carbon footprint per capita is about twice as large.6,7 China’s rapid industrialization 
starting in the 1980s launched the nation into over three decades of economic growth. In 
2014, China surpassed the U.S. as the largest economy based on purchasing power 
adjusted-GDP. 8 If the United States and China continue operating business as usual and 
do not pursue aggressive climate policies to curb emissions, the world could surpass the 
threshold of 2 degrees Celsius and experience exponentially higher risk of a global 
climate catastrophe. International and domestic efforts by other nations can only make a 
marginal impact without the participation, cooperation, and leadership of China and the 
5 In 2008, the UN estimated that climate change has displaced about 20 million people and projected the 
world will have about 200 million climate refugees by 2050. See Hannah Barnes, “How Many Climate 
Migrants Will There Be?” BBC, September 2, 2013, accessed on April 20, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-23899195. 
6 “China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” New York Times, June 20, 2007, accessed on 
February 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-
emit.1.6227564.html?_r=0. 
7 Maria Gallucci and Paul Horn, “For U.S. and China, World’s Biggest Climate Polluters, It’s Still Business 
as Usual,” Inside Climate News, February 3, 2014, accessed on February 5, 2015, 
http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20130129/united-states-china-carbon-greenhouse-gas-emissions-
renewable-energy-coal-plants-pollution-global-warming-climate. 
8 Purchasing power adjusted-GDP takes out the impact of foreign exchange rates in measuring economic 
output. In terms of real GDP, the U.S. still has a larger economy than China. See “China Surpasses U.S. as 
World’s Largest Economy Based on Key Measure,” Reuters, October 8, 2014, accessed on February 5, 
2015, http://rt.com/business/194264-china-surpass-us-gdp/. 
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United States. Thus, both nations have the unique responsibility to curb their emissions 
and lead efforts to combat climate change. 
Despite the critical importance of both countries’ ability to act on climate change, 
the Chinese and U.S climate agenda face constraints based on their distinct domestic 
political atmosphere and on how clear or diffuse they perceive the costs and benefits of 
certain climate policies. 9 Contrasting policy outcomes on the multilateral and bilateral 
stage capture the mix of friendship and antagonism that has defined the Sino-U.S. 
relationship in modern history. Multilateral climate negotiations exhibit tensions within 
the U.S.-China relationship. China and the United States have refused to make substantial 
commitments on collective climate action, citing each other’s inaction as the rationale for 
such policy stalemate. On the bilateral level, the two nations have engaged in a lot of 
climate policy collaboration, especially since President Barack Obama took over the 
White House in 2009. In November 2014, President Obama and President Xi Jinping 
made a historical agreement to reduce their nation-wide GHG emissions, a success that 
can be attributed to presidential leadership and changing policy preferences. The 
discrepancies between different levels of climate policy offer a unique narrative on the 
relationship between the United States and China as well as insights on the domestic 
political constraints and motivations of each nation. 
9 Climate policies include mitigation and adaptation strategies. Climate mitigation policies attempt to 
reduce emissions and curb climate change through improved energy efficiency, increased regulations on 
emissions-heavy industries, and renewable energy deployment. Climate adaptation finds strategies for 
society to adjust their lifestyle to the changing climate. Adaptation policies include building shore 
protection to guard against rising sea levels and developing emergency response plans for the changing 
intensity and frequency of extreme weather events. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Climate 
Change,” http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/.  
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Different theoretical frameworks, including Putnam’s two-level game, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, and the Coordination Game, showcase the contrasting faces of U.S.-China 
climate policy. Applying the two-level game framework to climate policy draws out two 
key insights. Firstly, domestic landscapes impact international policies more heavily than 
the international landscape influences domestic policies. The certainty and clarity of costs 
and benefits perceived by policymakers influence how heavily they will advocate for or 
against certain climate policies. Secondly, inconsistent policy outcomes between bilateral 
and multilateral levels suggest that policymakers view costs and benefits differently 
across the two international levels. On the bilateral scale, players assume payoffs shown 
in the Coordination Game, but perceive outcomes that reflect the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
matrix during multilateral negotiations.  
Due to the domestic political environments constraining both the United States 
and China, the nations have found bilateral collaboration more politically palatable and 
productive than multilateral engagements on climate change. Based on the lack of 
movement in multilateral policy, the world will likely see an increased role of bilateral 
climate agreements in advancing substantial climate policy. Moving forward, the United 
States and China should focus on keeping each other accountable on the bilateral level, 
which could build trust between the two nations and pave the way forward for more 
multilateral policy in the future. Understanding the complex dynamics between U.S. and 
Chinese interactions on climate change informs future expectations for conflict and 
collaboration—not only between these two nations, but among countries across the globe. 
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Other nations watch and take cue from China and the United States as indicators of how 
developed and developing nations should address climate change. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
Theoretical Frameworks for Climate Policy 
 
 
 Three theoretical frameworks help to structure the analysis of U.S.-China climate 
policies: Putnam’s two-level game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the Coordination Game. 
These different approaches are layered and combined in the cost-benefit matrix (see 
Figure 3), which captures the interdependent relationship between the United States and 
China. This matrix shows how domestic forces and their perception of costs and benefits 
influence climate policy.  
Putnam’s Two-Level Game 
In Robert Putnam’s “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games,” Putnam describes how international policymaking involves both international-
level and domestic-level groups. Domestic politics can influence international policies 
and vice a versa: 
At the national level (Level II), domestic groups pursue their interests by 
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power 
by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level (Level 
I), national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.10  
10 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization, Summer 1988, Vol. 42: 3, pg. 434. 
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These two levels are constrained and driven by one another. On Level I, international 
negotiators bargain over a tentative agreement that seeks to maximize the win-sets of the 
nations they represent.11 Win-sets refer to a collection of potential international policies 
that can gain enough domestic support for “ratification.”12 Putnam refers to “ratification” 
as any decision-making process on Level II required to implement an international 
agreement.13 Large win-sets indicate that domestic players can accept a variety of 
policies and increases the chances of overlap with the win-sets of other nations, making 
Level I agreement more likely. Small win-sets indicate that domestic policymakers will 
approve of a very limited set of policies, raising the barrier to advancing international 
policies. Win-sets depend on the preferences of domestic and international players, the 
distribution of power among these constituents, and Level II political institutions. After 
developing an international agreement, Level I players discuss the terms with their 
domestic counterparts in an effort to ratify the treaty.14 Any internationally binding treaty 
needs ratification by the domestic political institution in place. In practice, Level II 
interactions usually occur before Level I negotiations, so domestic players set clear 
expectations before sending negotiators to the international bargaining table.15 If the 
nations have small win-sets and domestic policy preferences do not overlap, nations are 
unlikely to reach an agreement. Thus, Putnam’s two-level game brings attention to the 
domestic political landscapes of the nations involved in the international agreement. 
11 Putnam, pg. 436. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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If the Level II political institution of a nation has a high level of autonomy and 
practices centralized decision-making, the nation has larger win-sets and is more likely to 
reach an international agreement.16 However, disclosing large win-sets could harm 
national interests by decreasing the nation’s bargaining power abroad. 17 Level I 
negotiators from other nations can “push around” this country and negotiate policies that 
distribute gains at a disadvantage to the nation with the larger win-sets. 18 The risk of 
getting short-ended in international agreements incentivizes nations to reduce the 
perceived size of their win-sets to bolster bargaining power. Understanding the 
perception of policy costs and benefits becomes critical to predicting these win-sets and 
policy negotiation behavior. 
Putnam also emphasizes that countries may have the incentive to cheat as a 
function of the size of their win-sets. Less overlap in ideal outcomes for either nation 
increases the chances of defection. Negotiators need to carefully consider domestic-level 
interests to minimize defection when striking a deal. Furthermore, Putnam asserts that 
“the temptation to defect can be dramatically reduced among players who expect to meet 
again.”19 The increased frequency and certainty of future negotiations keep both parties 
accountable to their agreements. Putnam’s two-level game codifies the role of domestic 
and international players in forging international agreements, which provides a clear 
framework to analyze U.S.-China climate policy. 
16 Putnam , pg. 449. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Putnam, pg. 440. 
19 Ibid. 
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Prisoner’s Dilemma vs. Coordination Game 
As implied in Putnam’s game, the two nations’ domestic political landscape 
constrains their climate strategy, both at home and abroad. Game theory models—the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Coordination Game—capture different approaches to climate 
policy in international negotiations and showcase how China and the United States 
operate in an interdependent space, where the other’s decisions will impact expectations 
of individual payoffs.20 Policymakers will hold initial presumptions of payoffs that 
influence their decision-making, regardless of whether their payoff expectations and the 
reality of policy outcomes align. Under the Prisoner’s Dilemma model (see Figure 1), if 
China invests in abatement technologies and the United States does not, policymakers 
predict that China will have a lower payoff than the United States. The United States 
faces the same outcomes of lower payoffs if the U.S. abates but China does not. Players 
can form assumptions that reflect this payoff matrix if they prioritize short-term 
economic gain and geopolitical competition. The players may view the economic cost 
burdens of abatement more clearly compared to the potential long-term, diffuse benefits 
of climate mitigation. 
 
 
 
20 Applying game theory models with payoffs and outcomes takes a realist approach to foreign relations, 
since the models often define winners and losers. Notably, game theory assumptions of interdependent 
behavior also suggest opportunities for international collaboration between two players in order to 
maximize payoffs, which give these games a liberal internationalist spin. 
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Figure 1. Sino-U.S. Climate Policy under the Prisoner’s Dilemma21    
  China’s Strategy 
  Invest in Abatement Pollute 
 
U.S. Strategy 
Invest in Abatement 3,3 1,4 
Pollute 4,1 2,2 
 
Each nation expects higher payoffs if asymmetrical abatement occurs (i.e. when one 
country invests in abatement and the other does not), suggesting that both nations will 
pollute and operate business as usual in Nash Equilibrium. Compared to the Nash 
Equilibrium, both countries would be better off if they negotiate an international 
agreement to abate.22 Even if both players initially agree to abate, either side can and will 
likely defect if the international agreement is not perfectly enforced, resulting in business 
as usual pollution levels.23 The Prisoner’s Dilemma framework suggests that the United 
States and China will continue polluting at increasing levels in a state of Nash 
Equilibrium, even though this leads to sub-optimal outcomes for both nations.   
In contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Coordination Game presents higher 
payoffs when both nations abate compared to results from asymmetrical abatement or 
non-abatement (see Figure 2). With these payoff assumptions, neither country has the 
incentive to defect from abatement.  
21 Stephen DeCanio and Anders Fremstad, “Game Theory and Climate Diplomacy,” Economics for Equity 
& Environment, October 2010, pg. 10. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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Figure 2. Sino-U.S. Climate Policy in a Coordination Game24 
  China’s Strategy 
  Invest in Abatement Pollute 
 
U.S. Strategy 
Invest in Abatement 4,4 1,3 
Pollute 3,1 2,2 
 
Assigning higher payoff expectations to collective abatement could suggest that both 
nations place a premium on curbing climate change. China and the United States could 
recognize the potential harm of collective inaction and expect economic gains from 
developing a green economy. 25 Higher payoff expectations can also arise from the 
political benefits of collective abatement, such as the increased political capital resulting 
from effective U.S.-China leadership and the multiplier effect when other nations follow 
suit in mitigation efforts. If these political and environmental benefits are more 
concentrated or clear than the short-term economic costs of abatement, then Chinese and 
U.S. policy decisions would reflect the Coordination Game. The Coordination Game 
framework implies that both nations have equally compelling motivations to invest in 
abatement and will likely cooperate on climate mitigation in Nash Equilibrium. The 
ability for China and the United States to collaborate on climate mitigation depends on 
whether nations subscribe to the assumptions within the Prisoner’s Dilemma or 
Coordination Game.  
24 DeCanio and Fremstad, pg. 13. 
25 Ibid. 
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Clarity in Costs and Benefits  
 The concentration and certainty of costs and benefits influence how the two 
players perceive payoffs, which guides climate policy behavior on the unilateral, 
bilateral, and multilateral level (see Figure 3). Costs and benefits expectations determine 
if China and the United States will operate under a Prisoner’s Dilemma or Coordination 
Game framework.  
Figure 3. Cost-Benefit Matrix  
 
When both nations recognize certain costs of abatement, neither is incentivized to abate. 
When benefits are certain for both nations, both will likely abate.26 When costs are 
certain for the U.S. while benefits are clear for China, China will take abatement action 
unilaterally. The opposite occurs if China expects abatement to lead to clear costs and the 
26 This model does not explicitly explain policy outcomes if certain climate policies have clear costs and 
clear benefits. Instead, the cost-benefit matrix presupposes that players have weighed the costs and benefits 
in order to decide which components are most concentrated, clear, and political valuable to act on.  
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U.S. expects clear benefits from abatement. Different stakeholders in the policy process 
may hold varying priorities. If the political institution separates legislators from the 
executive branch, these groups can hold disparate policy preferences. Notably, the 
President has a stake in Level I and Level II interactions, since he remains accountable to 
his constituents and also sets the foreign policy agenda. Members of opposing political 
parties, subject to the influence of distinct interest groups and constituents, also hold 
divergent policy preferences. Assumptions of costs and benefits are in the eye of the 
beholder, elevating the importance of how political institutions structure policymaking 
and engage with the general public. Depending on how much these stakeholders 
influence the Level I or Level II process, they can shape policies to match their policy 
preferences.  
An analysis of the domestic landscape and international dynamics between the 
United States and China reveal that both nations held assumptions reflecting the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff structure and explain why multilateral negotiations led to the 
lack of abatement. In contrast, bilateral agreements presented clear benefits for both 
parties, similar to payoffs in the Coordination Game. This framework builds more 
complexity to Putnam’s two-level game by distinguishing differences in multilateral and 
bilateral interactions. The cost-benefit framework, paired with a set of game theory 
concepts, are critical in analyzing U.S. and Chinese policies on a unilateral, bilateral, and 
multilateral level. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
The Domestic Policy Landscape 
 
 
Based on Putnam’s two-level game, the players within the domestic landscape 
determine the political palatability and feasibility of certain international climate policies. 
Different domestic political institutions, constituents, and policy preferences motivate 
and constrain the United States and China. The domestic policies of each nation display 
the political pressures facing policymakers and the perceived concentration or clarity of 
costs and benefits to stakeholders. This chapter provides the domestic background 
relevant to explore international climate policies of the United States and China. 
Specifically, national variables that influence climate policy at home and abroad include: 
1) the political institution, 2) the policy preferences of interest groups and policymakers, 
3) leadership commitment and influence, and 4) the competition for international 
influence and power. An analysis of the motivations behind U.S. and Chinese climate 
policy showcase the different political agendas and perceptions of costs and benefits 
driving each country. 
Drivers of U.S. Climate Policy: Federalism, Partisanship & Leadership 
The United States is governed by a democratic federalist government that has 
become marred by political partisanship, private interest groups, and divisive state 
14 
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interests. These factors have concentrated the costs and diluted the benefits of climate 
policy for legislators, creating a political environment not conducive to passing 
substantive federal climate policy. America’s desire to maintain global leadership and 
influence has placed a premium on the use of hard power in the form of economic and 
military strength, which further decreases the likelihood of implementing strong climate 
policy that could hinder economic growth. The Great Recession elevated the importance 
of economic growth as the nation’s top priority. Despite these factors that make 
authorizing U.S. climate policy unlikely, changes in presidential leadership have pushed 
climate policy to the forefront of the nations’ executive policy agenda, as climate 
mitigation remains an inactive topic in Congress.   
Under democratic governance, policy preferences of decision-makers in 
Washington should reflect public attitude toward climate change. Democratic processes 
incentivize policymakers to act in the interest of their constituents, since legislators gain 
votes from adequately representing their voter coalitions. Public opinion on climate 
change has fluctuated throughout the past two decades. In 2000, the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes found that “an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public 
embrace[d] the idea of global warming as a real problem that requires action” and 
favored the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.27 The percentage of Americans worried 
about climate change dropped dramatically after the 2008 financial crisis—only 36 
27 Steven Kull, “Americans on the Global Warming Treaty,” Program on International Policy Attitudes 
(PIPA), February 4, 2000. 
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percent thought Congress should prioritize protecting the environment.28 During the 
economic recession, people became cautious about imposing costs on industries that 
could slow economic recovery. As unemployment rates decreased and the economy 
rebounded over time, public opinion started to support an active role of policymakers in 
climate mitigation. In 2010, 69 percent of American believed that the United States 
should make a “large or medium-scale effort to reduce global warming even if it incurs 
large or moderate economic costs.”29 A majority (62 percent) of Americans also 
supported U.S. climate action regardless of other countries’ actions.30 The American 
public’s belief in climate change increased to 66 percent of respondents in 2014, 
including 88 percent of Democrats, 59 percent of Independents, and 61 percent of liberal 
and moderate Republicans.31 Voters indicated they are twice as likely “to vote for a 
congressional or presidential candidate who strongly supports” climate action.32 In the 
past two years, Americans favored protecting the environment more than developing 
energy supplies.33 The main outlier was conservative Republicans; only 28 percent of 
28 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans Increasingly Prioritize Economy over Environment,” Gallup, March 17, 
2011, accessed November 17, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx. 
29 Yale Project on Climate Change and Communication, “American Opinion on Climate Change Warms 
Up,” Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 2010, accessed on April 15, 2015, 
http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/article/american-opinion-on-climate-change-warms-
up. 
30 A. Leiserowitz, et al, “Politics & Global Warming,” Yale University and George Mason University, 
Spring 2014, New Haven, CT: Yale Project on Climate Change Communication. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33Oil prices have fallen as a result of advancements in hydraulic fracturing to extract natural gas, which 
may influence public policy preference toward environmental protection and energy development. The 
usual drawbacks of GHG emissions reduction regulations, including higher energy prices, are less salient 
since Americans have benefited from lower energy prices overall. See Andrew Dugan, “Americans Choose 
the Environment over Energy Development,” Gallup, April 13, 2015, accessed on April 15, 2015, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/182402/americans-choose-environment-energy-
development.aspx?utm_source=Politics&utm_medium=newsfeed&utm_campaign=tiles. 
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conservative Republicans believe that climate change is occurring and a majority of them 
indicated a lower likelihood to vote for a candidate with a strong climate policy 
platform.34 These ebbs and flows in public sentiment provide the initial context for U.S. 
climate policy. 
Despite rising public concern, the issue of climate change has grown increasingly 
partisan in Washington, which suggests legislators include additional considerations in 
their cost-benefit calculations. Republicans in Congress often deny climate change or any 
stringent legislation on emissions reduction, while Democrats usually advocate for 
increased regulation.35 Due to strategic gerrymandering and the current election process, 
elected officials have become increasingly radical and less representative of the general 
public. In other words, the policy preferences of voters from opposite ends of the 
spectrum are usually better represented than those of the general public. Furthermore, 
powerful interest groups influence the policymaking process by funding political 
campaigns and lobbying. Between 1998 and 2010, the oil and gas industry contributed 
$213 million to members of the Republican Party—a figure that far out shadows funding 
from environmental groups for political campaigns.36 Once elected, these policymakers 
have an incentive to pass or block legislation based on the interests of their funders in 
34 Leiserowitz, “Politics & Global Warming.”  
35 Prominent climate deniers in Congress include Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK), Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-
AL), Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and Senator Fred Upton (R-MI). Many politicians that deny 
climate change chair congressional committees and hold major leadership positions. Senator Jim Inhofe (R-
OK), head of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, has even denounced climate change as 
“the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people.” See Tom McCarthy, “Meet the Republicans 
in Congress Who Don’t Believe Climate Change Is Real,” The Guardian, November 17, 2014, accessed on 
April 20, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/17/climate-change-denial-scepticism-
republicans-congress.  
36 Daniel Weiss, “Anatomy of a Senate Climate Bill Death,” Think Progress, October 12, 2010, accessed 
November 22, 2013, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2010/10/12/206855/anatomy-of-a-senate-climate-bill-
death/. 
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hopes of receiving campaign support in future elections.37 Even if a majority of the 
public wants government action on climate, the increasingly radical Republican leaders in 
Congress have successfully blocked many climate policies. The oil and gas industry 
alongside other industry interest groups outspent environmental groups by almost eight-
fold during the legislative battle over the 2009 cap-and-trade bill, formally called the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES).38  
In addition to the partisan divide over climate change, state interests bind 
Congress from enacting effective climate policies. In the U.S. federalist system, elected 
officials must balance interests of the state and the nation. These interests often come into 
conflict in climate policy, since legislation on GHG emissions disproportionately impact 
states that rely on emissions-heavy industries. Congressmen and Senators representing 
states that depend on fossil fuel extraction—regardless of their political affiliation—often 
do not support legislation that imposes additional environmental regulations for fear of 
killing jobs and stalling economic growth in their state. Not only do Republican officials 
have the prerogative to oppose climate policy, their Democratic counterparts whom 
represent coal-reliant states will vote across party lines to protect their state economy. 
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), reducing GHG emissions 
through more stringent regulations on power plants have significant health benefits, 
37 Due to the amount of money it takes to run a successful political campaign, many elected officials exhibit 
the “never-ending campaign” phenomenon where they do not stop fundraising, which distracts 
policymakers from their core legislative responsibilities and can bias their decision-making.   
38 Pro-environment groups spent about $22.4 million on federal lobbying efforts, while the oil and gas 
industry spent $195 million. See Evan Mackinder, “Pro-Environment Groups Outmatched, Outspent in 
Battle over Climate Change Legislation,” OpenSecrets.org, August 23, 2010, accessed on April 22, 2015, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/08/pro-environment-groups-were-outmatc/. 
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outweighing costs from 8 to 1 or 12 to 1 by 2030.39 Every dollar invested could lead to 
$7 in health benefits alone.40 These regulations present clear benefits to the public, yet 
the uneven distribution of costs onto coal-heavy states has handicapped Congress from 
passing legislation to reduce emission from coal-fired power plants. To policymakers, 
increased regulations present concentrated cost in terms of losing political popularity and 
votes. Even though environmental regulations would decrease GHG emissions and 
mitigate climate change in the long-term, these benefits seem diffusive and not 
immediate enough for policymakers to put their careers on the line. 
As a result of this domestic political landscape, the United States has not made 
great strides in developing recent legislation to further address climate change and 
environmental issues. The death of the 2009 cap-and-trade bill revealed large barriers in 
authorizing effective climate policy in Congress.41 The controversial bill would create a 
carbon market where firms trade permits to emit. This market-based mechanism 
incentivizes firms to invest in abatement technologies and reduce emissions over time at 
relatively low compliance costs compared to alternative command-and-control policies. 
The bill passed through the House of Representatives on a partisan vote of 219 to 212,42 
39 Juliet Eilperin and Steven Mufson, “Everything You Need to Know about the EPA’s Proposed Rule on 
Coal Plants,” The Washington Post, June 2, 2014, accessed on April 16, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/epa-will-propose-a-rule-to-cut-emissions-from-
existing-coal-plants-by-up-to-30-percent/2014/06/02/f37f0a10-e81d-11e3-afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Alice Chang, “The Politics of Cap-and-Trade: Lessons from the European Union, Australia, and the 
United States,” The Journal of MacroTrends in Energy and Sustainability, Vol. 1 Issue 1, 2013.  
42 43 Democratic Congressmen voted against the bill, which suggests that state interests and other factors 
beyond partisanship influenced decision-making. See OpenCongress, “H.R. 2454 – American Clean 
Energy and Security Act of 2009,” https://www.opencongress.org/bill/hr2454-111/show. 
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but failed to gather enough support in the Senate, where Democrats did not hold a 
supermajority of 60 seats to circumvent the filibuster.  
While Congress remains divided over carbon reduction programs like cap-and-
trade, policymakers on the Hill have worked on less divisive issues, like clean energy 
deployment, energy efficiency, and natural gas development. These policy areas offer 
clear avenues for technological advancement, the creation of green jobs, and energy 
security. By presenting clear benefits to constituents and the American economy, 
politicians worked across partisan lines to push forward these policies. One of the most 
significant contributions of Congress in the recent energy policy regime is the promotion 
of natural gas extraction. Congress intentionally left many loopholes in legislation to 
minimize compliance costs for the natural gas industry. The Halliburton Loophole within 
the Safe Drinking Water Act allows drilling firms to not disclose the underground 
injection chemicals used during the fracking process. Other loopholes exist in the Clean 
Water Act and Clean Air Act. Natural gas emits far less GHG emissions compared to 
coal, and the deployment of natural gas has drastically reduced national emissions.43 
Congress also developed tax incentives, including the Federal Renewable Energy 
Production Tax Credit (PTC) and the Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), to foster a 
growing renewable energy industry. 44 The PTC, originally passed as a part of the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, supports the development of renewable energy facilities and has 
43 Natural gas should only be a transitional base load fuel, since the process of hydraulic fracturing still 
emits a lot of methane gas into the atmosphere that also contributes to climate change. 
44 Besides federal policies, 36 states have developed Renewable Portfolio Standards to promote renewable 
energy adoption, setting the target of 20 percent power generated from renewable energy by 2020. See 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “Renewable Portfolio Standards,” accessed on April 24, 2015, 
http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit. 
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largely benefited the wind energy sector. 45 Authorized by Congress through the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, the ITC provides a 30 percent tax credit for residential, commercial, 
and utility-scale solar systems, which has driven the increased adoption of solar energy 
systems, created green jobs, and decreased the cost of solar.46 In 2013, the U.S. invested 
$48.4 billion in the renewable energy sector.47 Since 2007, U.S. wind power generation 
grew by 300 percent, while solar generation increased by 600 percent.48 The solar energy 
industry employed over 140,000 American workers in 2013 with a projected 20 percent 
annual increase.49 Politicians can rally around protecting and promoting the U.S. 
renewable industry because of the green jobs and economic opportunities associated with 
the development of this sector. Arguably, setting regulations to reduce GHG emissions 
also drive innovation, create jobs, and promote energy security. However, the general 
public and politicians seem to see this connection as more tenuous compared to directly 
promoting the solar and wind industry and investing in the natural gas industry. Policies 
in clean energy and natural gas deployment are far more politically palatable than 
regulations on GHG emissions, which are often strategically branded as job-killing 
45 While the PTC has helped to grow U.S. wind capacity, the constant debate in Congress about extending 
the PTC has created a boom-bust cycle within the wind energy industry. In other words, the annual amount 
of installed wind capacity fluctuates based on uncertainties over whether the PTC would be renewed. See 
“Production Tax Credit for Renewable Energy,” Union of Concerned Scientists, accessed on April 23, 
2015, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables/production-tax-
credit-for.html#.VTpvmyFViko.  
46 “Solar Investment Tax Credit,” Solar Energy Industries Association, accessed on March 8, 2015, 
http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit. 
47 Angus McCrone, Ethan Zindler, and Nathaniel Bullard, “Clean Energy Investment Falls for Second 
Year,” Bloomberg New Energy Finance, January 14, 2014, accessed on March 8, 2015, 
http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/clean-energy-investment-falls-for-second-year/. 
48 John Miller, “How Effective Are U.S. Renewable Power Policies?” The Energy Collective, December 3, 
2013, accessed on March 8, 2015, http://theenergycollective.com/jemillerep/311406/how-effective-are-us-
renewable-power-policies. 
49 Senator Jon Tester, et al., Letter to Vice President Joe Biden on Solar Dispute, U.S. Congress, April 9, 
2014. 
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policies. Most politicians consider these policies on GHG emissions reduction noxious to 
their career. Congress’ choice in policy areas showcases the domestic political constraints 
on authorizing direct emissions reduction initiatives like a national cap-and-trade 
program.  
Besides the role of Congress in developing climate policies, the executive 
political leadership sets the policy agenda at home and abroad. President Bill Clinton 
(1993-2001), President George W. Bush (2001-2009), and President Barack Obama 
(2009 - current) all held distinct climate policy agendas. Prior to Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations in 1997, President Clinton expressed that the United States had “a clear 
responsibility and a golden opportunity to conquer…the challenge of climate change.” 50 
Reducing emissions can “create a wealth of new opportunities for entrepreneurs at home, 
uphold [U.S.] leadership abroad, and harness the power of free markets to free [the] 
planet from an unacceptable risk.”51 President Clinton’s rhetoric revealed his support for 
U.S. climate action—both unilaterally and in partnership with other nations. For instance, 
President Clinton launched a number of voluntary emissions reduction programs for the 
utilities, transportation, and construction industries and a $6.3 billion fund to stimulate 
energy efficiency practices.52 He also advocated for a carbon tax, but Congress did not 
accept this policy as an economically responsible means to reduce GHG emissions.53  
50 President Bill Clinton, “Address at National Geographic Society,” Oct. 22, 1997, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53442. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Amy Royden, “U.S. Climate Change Policy under President Clinton: A Look Back,” Golden Gate 
University Law Review, Vol. 32: 4, September 28, 2010.  
53 Ibid. 
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In contrast with President Clinton’s advocacy for strong climate policy, President 
Bush questioned the certainty of climate science and did not view climate change as an 
imminent treat that necessitated U.S. leadership, especially if imposing GHG emissions 
regulations could harm the domestic economy. President Bush said that “we do not know 
how much our climate could or will change in the future. We do not know how fast the 
change will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it.”54 In fact, President 
Bush supported energy policies that promoted emissions-heavy industries, like coal and 
petroleum. Prior to entering the White House, President Bush worked for 11 years in the 
oil and gas industry and received $21.3 million from the CEO of Enron, an energy 
commodities firm, during his presidential campaign.55 President Bush’s point of view on 
climate change and his close ties to the oil and gas industry explain the lack of climate 
mitigation policies during the Bush Administration, reversing much of the progress made 
under President Clinton.   
Once President Obama came into office in 2009, he made climate change a key 
priority for the nation and pledged to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 17 percent below 
2005 levels before 2020.56 These goals matched with emissions reduction targets outlined 
in ACES. Even though President Obama aspired to forward climate mitigation policies, 
he inherited a weak economy after the start of the Great Recession and lacked the public 
support to prioritize environmental protection over economic development. During his 
54 President George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change,” June 11, 2001, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html. 
55 Vice President Dick Cheney worked as CEO of Halliburton prior to coming into office. See Michael 
Lisowski, “Playing the Two-Level Game: U.S. President Bush’s Decision to Prepudiate the Kyoto 
Protocol,” Environmental Politics, 2002, Vol. 11: 4, pg. 106.   
56 Executive Office of the President, “The President’s Climate Action Plan,” June 2013. 
23 
 
                                               
An Analysis of U.S.-China Climate Policy 
first term, he chose to focus on the recovering economy and used his political capital to 
push through the health care reform. President Obama placed climate policy on the back 
burner after the 2009 cap-and-trade bill died in the Senate. After winning his second 
presidential election in 2012, President Obama moved full-force on climate policy and 
exercised his executive powers to implement emissions regulations. The 2013 Executive 
Climate Action Plan outlines clear policy priorities, such as deploying clean energy, 
decreasing emissions of the transportation sector, and building stronger infrastructure to 
adapt to the impacts of climate change.57 Besides these domestic efforts, the Obama 
Administration emphasized its commitment toward working with developed and 
developing nations to act on climate change.58 At the prompting of President Obama, the 
EPA has acted under the auspices of the Clean Air Act to set emissions regulations for 
the transportation sector and coal power plants.59 The EPA and the National highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) have set historically stringent vehicle emissions 
standards to reduce about 3.1 million metric tons of carbon emissions within the 
transportation industry. 60 Currently, the EPA is finalizing carbon pollution standards for 
coal power plants, which aim to reduce emissions by 30 percent of 2005 levels by 2030.61  
President Obama’s ambitious climate agenda suggests that he perceives clear 
benefits to advancing climate policy. He believes “there’s no greater threat to [the] planet 
than climate change” and hopes to leave a policy legacy within his second presidential 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 In Massachusetts v. EPA (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA 
to regulate greenhouse gases.  
60 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Regulatory Initiatives,” 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html. 
61 Eilperin and Mufson, “Everything You Need to Know about the EPA’s Proposed Rule on Coal Plants.” 
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term.62 The current Republican Congress makes the prospects of authorizing substantial 
climate policy grim for the remainder of President Obama’s term. The paralysis in 
Congress on climate policy places additional pressure and importance on the executive 
branch in developing regulations and international agreements. Legislators and executive 
leadership hold different policy preferences, illustrated through the lack of legislation on 
emissions reduction and a recent increase in executive action on climate mitigation.   
Drivers of China’s Climate Policy: Maintaining Legitimacy as a One-
Party State 
In contrast to the United States, the Communist Party of China (CPC) governs the 
nation in a one-party state, whose sole political agenda focuses on staying in power. With 
rising local protests and demands for better environmental protection measures, the CPC 
sees clear benefits to improve China’s environment. While China continues to focus on 
economic development, the Party’s self-interest has led to the creation of strategic 
policies and a national narrative to rebalance the nation’s breakneck growth with 
environmental protection. After China’s leadership transition to President Xi Jinping, he 
launched policies to achieve the Chinese Dream, a phrase he coined in 2012 to embody 
the aspirations of the Chinese people to improve their standard of living and to emulate 
China’s intentions of becoming a global superpower. To fulfill the Chinese Dream for the 
Chinese people, President Xi hopes to deliver “better education, more stable jobs, better 
62 Reena Flories, “Obama: ‘No Greater Threat’ Than Climate Change,” CBS News, April 18, 2015, 
accessed on April 19, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-warns-no-greater-threat-climate-
change/. 
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income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher standard, more 
comfortable living conditions, and a more beautiful environment.” 63 
Similar components that influence U.S. climate policy preferences shape the 
CPC’s win-sets and decision on how to act on climate. China’s political structure, 
shifting policy preferences in favor of sustainable development, changes in executive 
leadership, and the desire to project power overseas have contributed to the nation’s 
affinity toward unilateral GHG emissions reduction efforts. 64,65 While these components 
accurately explain some motivators for China’s climate action, the foundational driver 
that differentiates China from the United States is China’s political system. China 
operates under an authoritarian regime subject to different political constraints. The Party 
develops policies that promote political stability and has the authority to make national 
policy decisions without much pushback from political elites.  
More recently, the Chinese people have begun to recognize the value of 
ecosystem services and environmental preservation, making poor air quality a source of 
social instability. As a result of China’s unsustainable extraction and consumption of 
coal, the nation suffers from the consequences of poor air quality. In January 2013, the 
concentration of hazardous particles in Beijing’s air exceeded World Health Organization 
(WHO) standards by forty times; city residents referred to these conditions as an 
63 President Xi Jinping, Full Text of Speech by New Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping at the 
Politburo Standing Committee Members’ Meeting with the Press at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, 
BBC, November 15, 2012, accessed on March 23, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
20338586. 
64 Luke Schoen, “Why Is China Taking Action on Clean Energy and Climate Change,” ChinaFAQs, May 
2013, pg. 2.  
65 Lisa Williams, “China’s Climate Policies: Actors and Drivers,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
July 24, 2014. 
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“airpocalypse.”66 The Asian Development Bank found that “less than 1 percent of 
China’s 500 largest cities meet the WHO’s air quality standards.”67 In 2010, air pollution 
caused about 1.2 million premature deaths in China and drove down life expectancy by 
5.5 years in Northern China. 68 Poor air quality correlates to a rise in chronic illnesses, 
such as asthma and cancer, in both urban and rural populations. These realities leave 
many of China’s metropolises unsuitable for living and deter social elites and top talent 
from living in these regions.69 Since air pollution has such visible impacts on public 
health in certain parts of China, acting on this salient issue through emissions reduction 
programs can drastically improve the quality of life in these areas. Even though the main 
motivator for CPC policy has traditionally been fostering economic growth, the Party has 
a vested interest in environmental protection to maintain social stability. According to 
China’s 2013 State of the Environment report, the Chinese people held over 700 
demonstrations about environmental protection.70 Environmental protests have grown by 
29 percent each year from 1966 to 2011, which motivates the CPC to prioritize 
environmental protection and rebalance the nation’s breakneck economic growth.71 By 
implementing climate policies and curbing emissions now, the CPC hedges against long-
term threats to the regime. While a two-party system in the United States gives political 
66 Beina Xu, “China’s Environmental Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 25, 2014, accessed on 
February 2, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmental-crisis/p12608. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Genia Kostka, “Barriers to the Implementation of Environmental Policies at the Local Level in China,” 
World Bank, Development Research Group: Environment and Energy Team, August 2014, pg. 6. 
70 Stephen Vines, “How Will China Deal with Growing Anger over Pollution?” Al Jazeera, August 1, 2014, 
accessed on March 7, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/china-pollution-protests-
2014729105632310682.html. 
71 Ibid. 
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elites more leeway to point fingers at the opposition party and use each other as 
scapegoats, the Chinese political system has only one-party. If anything goes wrong, the 
Chinese people look to the CPC for answers. While the Party can deploy smart repression 
tactics, they acknowledge that addressing any potential risks of social unrest will benefit 
the Party in the long-term.  
After weighing the costs and benefits of climate policy to the regime, the CPC has 
implemented aggressive abatement goals. The CPC has set historically ambitious national 
targets to reducing energy intensity and carbon intensity in the 11th (2006 – 2010) and 
12th (2011 – 2015) Five-Year Plans (FYPs).72 In the 11th FYP, the government committed 
to reduce energy intensity by 20 percent before 2010.73 The 12th FYP aims to reduce 
carbon emissions intensity by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and to grow non-
fossil fuel sources to 11.4 percent of the total energy mix by 2015.74 A 2013 National 
Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) report outlines China’s investments in 
GHG emissions reduction programs, including developing clean energy and energy 
efficiency technologies, increasing forest carbon sinks, and piloting seven regional 
carbon cap-and-trade programs.75  
72 Energy intensity represents units of energy per dollar of GDP in order to measure how efficiency the 
economy converts energy into economic output. Carbon intensity refers to the amount of CO2 emitted per 
unit of energy produced.  
73 “CPI Study Finds China Made Solid Progress Towards 11th FYP Energy Intensity Targets But May Face 
Challenges in Meeting 12th FYP Targets,” Climate Policy Initiative, February 2011, accessed on April 19, 
2015, http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/press-release/cpi-study-finds-china-made-solid-progress-towards-
11th-fyp-energy-intensity-targets-but-may-face-challenges-in-meeting-12th-fyp-targets/. 
74 Joanna Lewis, “Energy and Climate Goals of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan,” Center for Climate and 
Energy Solutions, March 2011, http://www.c2es.org/international/key-country-policies/china/energy-
climate-goals-twelfth-five-year-plan. 
75 The National Development and Reform Commission, “China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing 
Climate Change,” The People’s Republic of China, 2013. 
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Besides bolstering the Party’s legitimacy, climate policy can also strengthen the 
Chinese economy and China’s international competitiveness. Then-Premier Wen Jiabao 
recognized the synergistic opportunity of economic growth and sustainable development: 
“greening of the economy is not a burden on growth; rather, it is an engine that drives 
growth and an effective means to achieve sustainable development.”76 China holds the 
title as the world’s largest investor in renewable energy, spending over $56.3 billion in 
2014,77 and retains 24 percent of the world’s renewable energy capacity.78 As of 2014, 
China has over twice as much renewable energy capacity compared to that of the United 
States, and more than four times as much capacity compared to Germany and India.79 
Much of this increase in capacity and generation is powered by China’s manufacturing 
sector. The Chinese people benefit from additional jobs in the growing renewable energy 
sector, which translates to clear advantages for the CPC in supporting the political status 
quo. 80 
Even if climate policies in China set back the local economy in the short-term, the 
CPC has developed smart repression mechanisms to absorb small-scale social tensions. 
As China transitions its energy sources to non-fossil fuels, these policies will inevitably 
lead to closures of coal power plants and job loss. As an authoritarian government, the 
76 President Xi, Full Text of Speech by New Communist Party General Secretary.  
77 Jack Perkowski, “China Leads in Renewable Investment - Again!” Forbes, June 17, 2014, accessed on 
March 5, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2014/06/17/china-leads-in-renewable-
investment-again/. 
78 Energy capacity differs from how much electricity is actually generated and used. Capacity refers to the 
maximum amount of energy the power sources are able to generate at one given time.  
79 John Mathews, “Falling Oil Prices Unlikely to Influence China’s Renewable Energy Investment 
Strategies,” Clean Technical, January 28, 2015, accessed on March 5, 2015, 
http://cleantechnica.com/2015/01/28/falling-oil-prices-unlikely-influence-chinas-renewable-energy-
investment-strategies/. 
80 In 2011, China had about 1.6 million jobs in the renewable energy industry. See Schoen, pg. 7. 
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CPC can mollify local unrest over lost jobs through calculated repression and point 
toward these policy decisions as necessary actions to improve air quality. In fact, the CPC 
ordered the closure of four major coal-fired power plants in Beijing to improve air quality 
and intends to replace coal-generated energy with natural gas-generated energy.81 The 
CPC strategically plans to build new power plants farther inland, away from metropolitan 
areas. 82 With hindsight of the Tiananmen Massacre and the resulting political damage, 
the Party views social unrest in urban areas as less manageable, more visible, and more 
threatening to the Party. While the government is in the process of piloting regional 
carbon cap-and-trade programs and more directly tackling GHG emissions reduction, the 
bulk of policy efforts such as coal plant closures and renewable energy development have 
largely focused on improving air quality and not necessarily climate mitigation. 83 The 
Chinese people are more likely to protest against public health concerns than worries 
about global climate change. Such strategic policies and behaviors reveal that the Party’s 
main priority is to maintain legitimacy. 
Similar to the United States, China underwent leadership transitions from 
President Hu Jintao (2003 - 2012) to President Xi Jinping (2012 - current). In a one-party 
system, the Party usually advances policies in a cohesive manner and decision-making 
illustrates heavy path dependency. The policy platform of succeeding leaders aligns 
81 David Stanway, “Beijing Shuts Big Coal-Fired Power Plant to Ease Smog: Xinhua,” Reuters, July 23, 
2014, accessed on March 8, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/23/us-china-pollution-beijing-
idUSKBN0FS16J20140723. 
82 Richard Martin, “China’s Great Coal Migration,” Fortune, July 11, 2014, accessed on March 8, 2015, 
http://fortune.com/2014/07/11/coal-china/. 
83 Kate Galbraith, “Don’t Get Caught Up in the Air Pollution Hype,” Foreign Policy, March 4, 2014, 
accessed on April 18, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/04/china-pollution-emissions-india-climate-
change/. 
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closely with that of prior political elites and builds upon previous policies. In contrast, the 
U.S. political structure and two-party system can result in drastic changes in the policy 
preferences of political elites across leadership transitions. Consecutive American 
presidents held opposing perspectives on climate change that slow downed and even 
reversed policies implemented in prior years. Starting in the early 2000s, the CPC built 
up momentum to reduce emissions and improve air quality and public health. The Party 
continued to pursue these climate policies domestically throughout President Hu and 
President Xi’s administrations.84  
Policymakers in either nation face differing costs and benefits, which either 
enable or block effective climate action. China’s climate policy is driven by the CPC’s 
concern to remain in power, while the United States has more political barriers to 
overcome in a democratic, federalist system. The United States has struggled to take 
substantial legislative action on climate change due to congressional perceptions of 
concentrated costs and diffuse benefits associated with taking climate action. Deadlock in 
Congress elevated the role of the executive branch in developing climate policies. 
Political factors in China led to the expedient deployment of climate policies, because 
these climate policies result in clear benefits for the CPC. These dynamics inform China 
and U.S. behavior on the international level, as predicted in Putnam’s two-level game.  
 
 
84 While Chinese leadership acts more cohesively compared to U.S. leaders from opposing parties, the 
different personalities of the two Chinese presidents shifted China’s climate policy abroad (see Chapter 
Four). 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
The International Policy Landscape 
 
 
In addition to the importance of domestic-level players, Putnam emphasizes the 
role of international negotiators and the international political context. This chapter takes 
a thematic look at the Sino-U.S. relationship to understand ongoing power dynamics and 
tensions.85 Since the Reagan Administration, the bilateral relationship has developed a 
hot and cold narrative. The two nations can be friends in certain situations and foes in 
others. Conflicting interests, the lack of trust, and adverse domestic political 
environments characterize the adversarial side of the Sino-U.S. relationship. These 
nations are woven from different cloth; different histories have formed contrasting values 
that often conflict and result in adversarial behavior. American and Chinese political 
ideologies and political systems fundamentally oppose one another. Even though most 
political indicators push these two countries apart, realities of their economic 
interdependence pull them back together and incentivize strategic cooperation to ensure 
mutual growth. According to J. Stapleton Roy, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center, neither country hopes to engage in “unchecked strategic rivalry,” 
85 For additional background on U.S.-China foreign policy, refer to Warren Cohen’s America’s Response to 
China: A History of Sino-American Relations. 
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since it could lead to political and economic instability. 86 Instead, the two nations have 
agreed to seek “a stable and sustainable balance between competition and cooperation.”87 
More recently, China and the United States have recognized their overlapping interests in 
issues such as energy security, climate change, and nuclear nonproliferation. 
Understanding the push and pull dynamics between the United States and China 
contextualizes the two nations’ points of view when entering international climate 
discussions and the different behavior each nation exhibits on the bilateral and 
multilateral policy levels. 
The Rise to Global Power 
The Korean War, a proxy war in Vietnam, and ideological tensions over Taiwan 
fueled intense rivalry between the United States and China before rapprochement in the 
1970s.88 After the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, China began to 
open up to the world under Deng Xiaoping’s growth-focused leadership. Powered by 
China’s impressive economic growth, the nation has become a dominant economic, 
political, and military force in the East and across the globe. Benefiting from low labor 
costs, China held a trade surplus of over $60 billion as of January 2015, marking a record 
high in net exports and affirming China’s critical role in supporting global 
consumption.89 China currently makes up 14.3 percent of the world’s GDP.90 
86 J. Stapleton Roy, “Opening Statement at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on U.S.-China 
Relations,” Wilson Center, June 26, 2014, accessed on February 16, 2016, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-future-us-china-relations. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Pew Center on Global Climate Change and Asia Society, “A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on 
Energy and Climate Change,” January 2009, pg. 14. 
89 “China Balance of Trade,” Trading Economics, accessed on February 14, 2015, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/balance-of-trade. 
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Conservative estimates project that China will contribute to 28 percent of the global GDP 
by 2030.91 In March 2014, China announced a 12.2 percent increase in its military 
budget, which signifies the nation’s intent to hold a strong military presence in the Pacific 
region.92 Nearly a decade before, the CPC coined the term “peaceful rise” to characterize 
the nation’s intentions as benign and to ensure that China’s rise to power does not 
destabilize or disrupt the region.93 Increases in military spending do not necessarily 
indicate that China has empirical intentions. However, the CPC must balance their 
commitment to peaceful development with its priority to maintain sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. 94 Challenges to do so—as with territorial disputes over Diaoyu 
Islands—have already led to increased regional instability in the Asia-Pacific as well as 
growing internal unrest.  
While China’s economy has grown exponentially and has caught up to the United 
States in terms of purchasing power adjusted-GDP, “parity on paper will not quickly 
yield equal influence abroad” and the United States remains the world’s most influential 
nation.95 The United States became a world power in the 20th century, particularly during 
and after World War II. The nation developed foreign policies to create a world order 
90 Daniel Kliman, “Is China the Fastest-Rising Power in History?” Foreign Policy, May 16, 2014, accessed 
on February 14, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/is-china-the-fastest-rising-power-in-history/. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Edward Wong, “China Announced 12.2% Increase in Military Budget,” The New York Times, March 5, 
2014, accessed on February 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/asia/china-military-
budget.html?_r=0. 
93 Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China and its Power Status,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 
1, 2006, pg. 5 – 33.  
94 Roy, “Opening Statement at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on U.S.-China Relations.” 
95 Kliman, “Is China the Fastest-Rising Power in History?”  
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aligned with American interests and values of freedom and democracy.96 Due to China’s 
rapid rise, the United States has a national interest to increase engagement with China. 
However, attempts to project American values on China are bound to lead to points of 
contention, as shown through disagreements over Taiwan and human rights issues. 
Judging by the mutual benefit of U.S.-China trade as well as the scale of influence both 
countries have across the globe, a new Cold War between the United States and China 
does not fall under the interest of any nation. Developing and maintaining a strategic 
partnership serves as the key to U.S. and Chinese development as well as global stability. 
Push Effect: Conflicting Political Values  
While the Founding Fathers of the United States envisioned a nation of free and 
liberated citizens in a democratic republic, the Communist Party of China developed 
political order using communist ideology. Even though the CPC has largely abandoned 
its founding communist ideology, the Party’s focus on protecting its legitimacy and 
sovereignty often comes into conflict with the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Conflicts over 
Taiwan and human rights issues revealed fundamental differences in values between the 
two nations and generated distrust and suspicion. The recent rise in nationalism 
exacerbates these bilateral disputes. Disregarding their internal contentions with the 
Party, the Chinese people largely buy-in to China’s victimization narrative, and resent 
America for attempting to suppress China’s rise to global supremacy. 
Acknowledging Taiwan’s independence versus the “One China” policy has been a 
point of contention between the two nations and fueled growing distrust. Taiwan is 
96 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2010, pg. 195. 
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governed by a democratic republic that aligns with U.S. political ideals. In the past, the 
United States dealt arms to Taiwan at great disapproval of the CPC. Chinese leaders 
interpreted U.S. behavior as deceitful and attributed it to the U.S. agenda to obstruct the 
reunification of China. 97 During the Bush Administration, President Bush viewed China 
a “strategic competitor” and tended to deploy hardline strategies to contain China, such as 
developing long-range anti- missile systems in response to China’s growing military 
power, increasing arms sales to Taiwan, and vowing to “do whatever it takes” to defend 
Taiwan from mainland attacks.98,99 Though President Bush quickly withdrew his 
statement about Taiwan and publicly endorsed the “One China” policy, the Bush 
Administration did not make U.S.-China cooperation a priority and often fostered a more 
adversarial tone.100 Tensions over Taiwan highlighted fundamental political differences 
between China and the United States and raised suspicions toward one another. 
The treatment of political dissidents and minority groups in China represents 
another point of social and political strain. The regime uses a portfolio of tactics, such as 
violence, coercion, and imprisonment, to deter and contain dissidents throughout the 
country, which directly opposes American values of free speech and freedom of 
expression. The violent suppression of political dissent on June 4th, 1989, demonstrated 
97 China retaliated by selling arms to U.S. adversaries, including Iran, Syria, and Libya. See Warren Cohen, 
pg. 226-227, 233. And see Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s 
Asia Strategy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2012, pg. 71.  
98 Tony Karon, “Bush China Policy Defaults to Engagement,” TIME, July 31, 2001, accessed on April 19, 
2015, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,169585,00.html. 
99 John Lewis, “The Contradictions of Bush’s China Policy,” The New York Times, June 2, 2001, accessed 
on April 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/02/opinion/the-contradictions-of-bush-s-china-
policy.html. 
100 Al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11th in 2001 shifted the Bush Administration’s focus away from Asia 
and toward the Middle East and the war on terrorism. See Bader, pg. 20. 
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the gap between American values and those of the Party. 101,102 Besides the Tiananmen 
Massacre, the Chinese government has deployed oppressive tactics on Tibetans and 
Uighurs through denying their religious freedom, which violates the basic human rights 
that Americans hold dear.103 The CPC views these religious gatherings as precursors to 
social unrest and separatist movements.   
The resurgence of China’s victimization narrative and a new wave of nationalism 
exacerbate Sino-U.S. tensions. Many Chinese people believe that foreigners from Japan 
and the West have humiliated and victimized their nation in a “Century of 
Humiliation.”104 In light of the Chinese Dream and the perpetuation of this victimization 
narrative throughout popular and elite levels, China may interpret any restricting U.S. 
foreign policy as a strategic move to stunt and contain China’s growth.105 This popular 
belief generates distrust in Beijing toward American policies, leading to chronic levels of 
resentment and suspicion between the two countries. A complex blend of political 
disagreements, historical narratives, and competing national interests repel these nations 
from each other.  
Pull Effect: Interdependence & Overlapping Interests 
While the two nations have conflicting values, they undeniably rely on one 
another for economic growth and share other overlapping interests. In 2014, the United 
101 Cohen, pg. 257. 
102The United States placed sanctions on China to display its disapproval and disgust towards the 
Tiananmen Massacre. Namely, the United States tried to remove China from its most favored nation 
(MFN) trading status and threatened nonrenewal of China’s MFN status if the country does not meet 
certain human rights standards. See Bader, pg. 19. 
103 Elliot Sperling, “Human Rights Violations in Tibet,” Human Rights Watch, June 14, 2000, accessed on 
February 16, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/06/12/human-rights-violations-tibet. 
104 Orville Schell, “China’s Victimization Syndrome,” Project Syndicate, April 22, 2005, accessed on April 
19, 2015, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-s-victimization-syndrome. 
105 Cohen, pg. 248. 
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States had a trade deficit of over $342 billion with China106 and remains the largest 
importer of Chinese goods.107 China’s export-led growth needs American consumers. 
China purchases U.S. government bonds as a stable investment option, which finances 
U.S national debt.108 China enjoys the benefits of technology transfers from Western 
innovators and foreign direct investment from American investors. In 2009, the U.S.-
China Business Council reported that American firms, like Apple and Nike, invested $3.6 
billion in China.109 These American businesses can access cheap labor markets in China 
and keep costs low.110 Furthermore, many U.S. companies see China as their top growth 
market.111 The American and Chinese economies are intertwined, which incentivizes 
collaboration and cooperation for mutual benefit. 
According to the Pew Center on Global and Climate Change and Asia Society, 
“leaders in both nations have recognized their increasing strategic interdependence and 
have effectively collaborated to solve or manage regional and global threats and 
106 “Trade in Goods with China,” Census.gov, accessed on February 16, 2015, 
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html. 
107 “U.S-China Trade Facts,” Office of the United states Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/countries-
regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china. 
108 While purchasing U.S. bonds help finance U.S. national debt, China’s monetary policies have become a 
point of contention. On economic grounds, the U.S. disagrees with the CPC’s monetary policies that fix 
exchange rates and artificially weaken the Renminbi (RMB) to promote China’s export-driven growth. The 
CPC buys U.S. government debt with newly printed currency to flood the market with RMB and artificially 
drive down exchange rates. As a result of the weaker RMB, the value of the USD appreciates, which favors 
China’s export-driven industry by making Chinese goods relatively cheaper. However, the CPC rejects any 
accusations of currency manipulation. See Brian Palmer, “If Currency Manipulation Is So Great for 
Exports, Why Don’t We Do It?” Slate, October 17, 2012, accessed on February 16, 2015, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/10/china_currency_manipulation_how_do
es_it_harm_the_u_s_and_what_can_we_do.html. 
109 Gady Epstein and Robyn Meredith, “U.S. Companies that Invest Big in China,” Forbes, July 5, 2010, 
accessed on April 23, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/05/us-investments-china-markets-emerging-
markets-fdi.html. 
110 Bernard Shusman, “U.S. Experts See Growing Desire to Curb Outsourcing to China,” Voice of America, 
April 28, 2014, accessed on February 16, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/us-experts-see-growing-
desire-to-curb-outsourcing-to-china/1903083.html. 
111 Epstein and Meredith, “U.S. Companies that Invest Big in China.” 
38 
 
                                               
An Analysis of U.S.-China Climate Policy 
challenges.”112 The two nations began to understand the importance of developing a 
strategic partnership and identifying common interests in global issues, such as nuclear 
nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran, energy security, and climate change.113 Unlike 
prior administrations that took a fairly hostile approach toward China, the Obama 
Administration treated China as a potential partner in tackling global issues instead of an 
inevitable adversary.114 President Obama explicitly placed the Asia-Pacific region as a 
high priority on the American foreign policy agenda, which largely focused on the 
Middle East under the Bush Administration. President Obama prescribed a “pivot” to 
Asia in hopes of rebalancing power in the East and establishing a strong American 
presence across Asia. The United States cannot contain China with similar strategies 
deployed against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Instead, the United States must 
engage and partner with China as an equal. According to Yun Sun, a senior fellow at the 
Stimson Center, a global security think tank, “counter to the heated rhetoric over the last 
few years, U.S.-China relations show more signs of cooperation than confrontation right 
now.”115 While this brief description of the Sino-American relationship only highlights 
moments of tension and friendship, it showcases the complex and often conflicting nature 
of their bilateral interaction based on concurrently opposing and overlapping interests.  
112 Pew Center on Global Climate Change and Asia Society, pg. 14. 
113 In the 1980s, China and the United States worked together as Anti-Soviet allies during the Cold War. 
However, this relationship cooled quickly and the United States hosted no state visits for over a decade, 
until President Jiang Zemin visited in 1997. President Bush undermined much of the amelioration of U.S.-
China relations under President Clinton by taking a fairly adversarial stance on China. See Warren Cohen, 
“The United States and China During the Cold War,” The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, 
http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/seventies/essays/united-states-and-china-during-cold-war. 
114 Bader, pg. 69. 
115 Emily Pauhala, “The APEC Summit Closes with a ‘Historic’ Climate Deal between the U.S. and 
China,” TIME, November 12, 2014, accessed on March 24, 2015, http://time.com/3577820/apec-climate-
change-barack-obama-xi-jinping-greenhouse-gas/. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
Stalemate on the Multilateral Level 
 
 
Climate change policy captures a unique cross-section within decision-making, 
where policymakers must balance political posturing, economic growth, and 
environmental integrity. To complicate policymaking further, GHG pollution does not 
respect national boundaries, making multilateral collaboration and collective action 
critical in tackling the challenge of climate change.116 Collective climate action would 
drastically reduce GHG emissions, slow the increase in atmospheric temperatures, and 
hedge against higher abatement costs in the future.117 However, climate mitigation is a 
public good, which creates the issue of free-riding where non-abating nations reap the 
same benefits of abatement without bearing any additional costs. If certain nations invest 
more in abatement technologies, other countries could free-ride, which deters early 
investor nations from making additional investments.118 These free-riders gain unfair 
economic advantages from offering lower prices on the global market at the expense of 
116 Jonathan Mellor, “Game Theory Offers Lessons in Collective Action and Climate Change,” Yale 
Climate & Energy Institute, January 23, 2014, accessed on February 21, 2015, 
http://climate.yale.edu/news/game-theory-offers-lessons-collective-action-and-climate-change. 
117 Julie Rehmeyer, “Game Theory Suggests Current Climate Negotiations Won’t Avert Catastrophe,” 
Science News, October 29, 2012, accessed on February 21, 2015, http://climate.yale.edu/news/game-
theory-offers-lessons-collective-action-and-climate-change. 
118 Ibid. 
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nations that abated. 119 If nations agree to take collective action, parties can defect and 
free-ride due to the lack of accountability in non-binding, multilateral agreements. Thus, 
nations should develop binding and enforceable multilateral agreements to avoid free-
riding. In practice, most climate agreements—assuming the parties even draft up an 
agreement—end up as a watered down and toothless version of themselves after the 
negotiation process as international delegations fight to maximize their win-sets.  
Chinese and U.S. behavior during bilateral and multilateral climate negotiations 
embody their nuanced, multifaceted relationship. In Putnam’s two-level game, Putnam 
does not explicitly separate multilateral and bilateral levels in his Level I analysis. 
However, U.S.-China actions in these two contexts led to divergent policy outcomes. On 
a multilateral level, both China and the United States played fairly conservative roles in 
climate negotiations, sometimes even blocking progress in climate mitigation 
agreements. The complex dynamics on the multilateral scale have produced climate 
policy outcomes represented in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In contrast, the two nations 
engaged in bilateral collaboration and forwarded joint climate mitigation programs, 
suggesting more alignment with the Coordination Game in the bilateral context. These 
two opposing policy outcomes exemplify how China and the United States exhibit 
difference faces of their complex relationship depending on their assessment of costs and 
benefits. Multilateral interactions showcase one face of the U.S.-China relationship—one 
of antagonistic competition and short-term geopolitical interests—while bilateral 
interactions reflect friendlier, more cooperative tendencies between the two nations.  
119 Rehmeyer, “Game Theory Suggests Current Climate Negotiations Won’t Avert Catastrophe.”  
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Analyzing the rhetoric of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and COP15 
demonstrate how domestic political preferences and the lack of trust between the two 
nations contributed to small win-sets that lacked enough overlap and blocked effective 
collective action on climate change. Both nations found it politically enticing and 
strategic to prioritize economic growth over abatement on the multilateral level due to the 
risk of free-riding. Thus, both nations’ dominant strategies have been to pollute and not 
make notable commitments to emissions reduction on the multilateral stage. Inaction by 
the United States and China had profoundly negative consequences on forwarding 
international climate policy. When these large players do not support a treaty or 
agreement, the agreement loses clout. If the two largest economies and emitters do not 
lead global climate mitigation and adaptation efforts, other countries have little incentive 
to invest and commit to abatement.  
The Kyoto Protocol 
In 1992, delegate countries developed and signed the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the goal of taking collective action to 
curb GHG emissions.120 The UNFCCC divided developed and developing nations into 
Annex I or Non-Annex I nations, respectively. The UNFCCC categorized China as a 
Non-Annex I country and the United States as an Annex I nation. Part of the Convention 
mandates annual meetings known as Conference of the Parties (COPs) to forward the 
global climate policy regime. In 1997, delegate nations met in Kyoto for COP3 and 
crafted the Kyoto Protocol—the first international treaty in history focused on decreasing 
120 Alan Manne and Richard Richels, “The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-Effective Strategy for Meeting 
Environmental Objectives?” Efficiency and Equity of Climate Change Policy, 1999, pg. 43. 
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GHG emissions. The binding agreement committed Annex I signatories to decreasing 
emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. 121,122 The 
Kyoto Protocol exempted developing nations from meeting GHG emissions reduction 
targets to allow these nations to develop without hindrance from high abatement costs. 
The Protocol used the “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR) principle to 
justify the uneven distribution of climate mitigation and adaptation responsibilities 
between developed and developing nations. Industrialized nations polluted freely for 
decades after the Industrial Revolution, imposing externalities upon the world’s 
environment for which they should compensate. Notably, the impacts of climate change 
asymmetrically affected poorer countries more than industrialized nations. Wealthier 
nations also had more resources to invest in abatement and greater capacity to absorb the 
cost burden of abatement. Currently, 192 nations, including China, have ratified the 
Protocol.123 Even though Vice President Al Gore signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, the 
U.S. withdrew from the Protocol and refused to ratify it. This withdrawal demonstrated 
the influence of domestic political actors, which held unfavorable perceptions of costs 
and benefits toward the multilateral climate treaty.124  
121 “Kyoto Protocol,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed on February 
23, 2015, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
122 At a COP in Doha, Qatar, 37 nations agreed upon a second commitment period in 2012, which bound 
them to collectively reduce emissions by 18 percent below 1990 levels before 2020. See Christina Figueres, 
“Environmental Issues: Time to Abandon Blame-Games and Become Proactive,” The Economic Times, 
December 15, 2012, accessed on April 20, 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-
15/news/35836633_1_emission-reduction-targets-global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-climate-change. 
123 “Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, accessed on February 26, 2015, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php. 
124 Initially, Vice President Al Gore signed the Kyoto Protocol with a national commitment to decrease 
GHG emissions by 7 percent. See Agrawala and Andresen, “U.S. Climate Policy: Evolution and Future 
Prospects,” Energy and Environment, 2001. 
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Even though a majority of Americans supported the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, an uncompromising Senate and a change in executive leadership blocked the 
ratification of the Protocol. In 2000, the Program on International Policy Attitudes found 
that “an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public embrace[d] the idea of global warming 
is a real problem that requires action” and favored the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol.125 The lack of public understanding and salience around Kyoto offers an 
explanation for the inconsistency in policy preferences between the general public and 
the government. Only 7 to 25 percent of the public heard or knew about the ongoing 
climate negotiation.126 Another survey found that the American public held drastic 
misperceptions on whether President Bush supported or opposed the Kyoto Protocol. 
Respondents’ responses split nearly half-half on whether President Bush supported or 
opposed the Protocol, even though President Bush repudiated the agreement.127 Kyoto’s 
lack of saliency and public misperceptions of governmental support undermined the 
impact of public opinion as a guiding principle for elected officials. 
On Level II of Putnam’s two-level game, domestic players explicitly defined 
small win-sets for international negotiators to work with through the Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution of 1997. Senate unanimously passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution to signal that 
that legislators would refuse to ratify any international treaty unless the agreement “also 
mandate[d] new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas 
125 Kull, “Americans on the Global Warming Treaty.”  
126 Matthew Nisbet and Teresa Myers, “Twenty Years of Public Opinion About Global Warming,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol 71:3, Fall 2007, pg. 448. 
127 Nisbet Myers, pg. 450. 
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emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period.”128 
Ironically, many of the provisions within the Kyoto Protocol were supported and 
promoted by the U.S. delegation while under the Clinton Administration, which 
highlights the tensions between the domestic and international levels when they hold 
different policy preferences. The inconsistency in policy preferences across presidential 
leadership and Congress revealed drawbacks of the American political system on an 
international stage. Congress believed that exemption of developing nations, like China, 
would “result in serious harm to the United States economy, including significant job 
loss, trade disadvantages, [and] increased energy and consumer costs” as U.S. firms face 
higher compliance costs and production moves to countries with less stringent 
regulations.129 Studies found that the United States “would have to spend over $400 
billion to comply” with the Kyoto Protocol, but would only reap 4 percent of the cost in 
monetized benefits.130,131 The implementation of Kyoto could almost double electricity 
prices, impose additional business expenses on the American economy, increase 
unemployment by 2.3 million U.S. jobs, and make U.S. firms less competitive compared 
to developing countries.132 Increased unemployment would also lower household income 
128 Senate Resolution 98, 105th Congress. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Cass Sunstein, “The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives 
of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters,” UCLA Law Review, 2008, pg. 1680. 
131 Annex I signatories of the Kyoto Protocol face high compliance costs. The global cost of implementing 
the Kyoto Protocol is about $700 billion in present value. Compliance could slow global GDP growth 
between 0.2 to 2.0 percent in 2010. See Jon Hovie, Tora Skodvin, and Steinar Adresen, “The Persistence of 
the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States,” Global 
Environmental Politics, Vol. 3: 4, November 2003, pg. 3. 
132 WEFA, Inc., “Global Warming: The High Cost of the Kyoto Protocol,” 1998. 
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by $2,700 and decrease state tax revenues by $93.1 billion.133 In the globalized economy, 
mandates to reduce emissions would significantly hinder U.S. economic growth and 
weaken the nation’s global influence.134 The certainty of economic costs made Kyoto 
politically unpalatable for policymakers in Congress.  
Not only would exempting developing nations from reduction targets harm the 
U.S. economy, Congress recognized that “exemption for Developing Country Parties is 
inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and is environmentally 
flawed.”135 Regardless of U.S. abatement efforts, the world cannot curb temperature rise 
if China does not reduce emissions, especially since China derives 70 percent of its 
energy from coal combustion and makes up about half of the world’s coal 
consumption.136 Complying signatories only produced about 20 percent of the world’s 
emissions, so exempting developing nations dramatically decreased the efficacy of the 
Kyoto Protocol in cutting emissions and made the benefits diffuse and nearly negligible.  
Upon coming into office in 2001, President Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol 
for similar reasons stated in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. In a letter from President Bush to 
Senator Hagel, he agreed that the Kyoto Protocol would be “unfair” and “ineffective” 
because “it exempt[ed] 80 percent of the world,” including China, “from compliance, and 
would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy,” especially considering the uncertainty of 
climate science.137 Since aggressive emissions reductions would impose additional costs 
133 Ibid. 
134 DeCanio and Fremstad, pg. 12. 
135 Senate Resolution 98, 105th Congress. 
136 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China,” February 4, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf. 
137 Lisowski, pg. 107. 
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on the oil and gas industry, President Bush found the Kyoto Protocol inconsistent with 
his energy policy preferences and detrimental to his close relationship with the oil and 
gas industry. During his first presidential term, President Bush was hesitant to push 
through contentious policies in order to maintain political popularity, particularly catering 
to his conservative, pro-industry voter and donor base. President Bush held similar payoff 
expectations as the 105th Congress; supporting the Kyoto Protocol had clear, negative 
consequences on the U.S. economy and his political career.  
Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol would subject the United States to clear and 
substantial economic costs, but diffuse and not immediate benefits. As a result of these 
potential economic costs—exacerbated by the lack of abatement commitment by China—
politicians in the White House and on the Hill had little incentive to approve policies that 
can set back the economy. The United States expected little gains from climate change 
mitigation, since the effects of climate change impact developing nations far more than 
industrialized ones. As a Non-Annex I nation, China did not need to make any binding 
commitments and was able to free-ride as it continued to develop its economy without the 
burden of high abatement costs. Since China did not need to abate, the United States 
refused to commit to emissions reduction targets. The U.S. and Chinese attitude toward 
the Kyoto Protocol represented a Prisoner’s Dilemma, where both players preferred 
asymmetrical abatement in hopes of higher economic payoffs. Ultimately, neither player 
agreed to binding GHG emissions reductions in the Kyoto Protocol.   
While both nations acted in their national interest, their payoff assumptions may 
not have included the impact of their inaction on their bilateral relationship or the 
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multilateral agreement. U.S. behavior throughout Kyoto Protocol negotiations created 
tension between the two nations and negatively impacted U.S.-China relations. U.S. 
policymakers cited maintaining fair economic competition and gaining early buy-in from 
developing countries as key reasons for denying the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.138 
The United States adopted a “we won’t move before China does” stance on collective 
climate action, highlighting the interdependency of climate policy on the multilateral 
level.139,140 However, China saw the U.S. requirements of developing nations as a direct 
attack and an attempt to stifle their development, which supported China’s victimization 
narrative. Chinese officials saw the repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol as a strategic move 
by the U.S. to escape the responsibilities it had promised to uphold under the Clinton 
Administration and grew the level of distrust between the two nations during the Bush 
Era. China believed any substantial efforts made toward collective climate action and 
emissions reductions mandate leadership from developed nations.141  
The lack of U.S. leadership at Kyoto decreased the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol, 
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, and poisoned the atmosphere for future climate 
negotiations. 142 Nations bound by Kyoto emit about 20 percent of global emissions and 
138 Paul Harris, “Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States 
Policy,” New York University Environmental Law Journal, 1999, Vol. 7, pg. 27. 
139 Harris, pg. 38. 
140 Jesse Jenkins, “Is the U.S.-China Climate Change Deal a Game-Changer? An Interview with MIT’s 
Valerie Karplus,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative, December 10, 2014, accessed 
on April 19, 2015, http://mitei.mit.edu/news/us-china-climate-change-deal-game-changer-interview-mits-
valerie-karplus. 
141 Tangen, Heggelund, and Buen, “China’s Climate Change Positions: At a Turning Point” Energy and 
Environment, 2011, Vol 12, No 2, pg 237-252. 
142 Some argue that despite U.S. withdrawal, the Kyoto Protocol symbolizes a step in the right direction. 
Nations can develop more ambitious targets moving forward. However, the lack of stringent targets and 
limited buy-in by key players also suggest that multilateral players have set a weak precedent for future 
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compliance would only lower emissions by 0.9 percent.143 These projections do not meet 
the abatement levels necessary to effectively slow rising temperatures. U.S. withdrawal 
from Kyoto also led to a political leadership vacuum. While the European Union and 
other developed nations pushed forward with Kyoto, the United States has more political 
and economic influence across the globe and produces a larger carbon footprint. If the 
U.S. invests in abatement, other nations are more likely to follow. Any multilateral 
agreement needs the United States as a signatory and supporter to make a substantial 
impact on mitigating climate change. Level I outcomes at Kyoto demonstrated the 
importance of domestic policy preferences and the interdependency of climate action 
between the United States and China. However, the perception of costs and benefits did 
not incorporate the impact of their decision on external players and the global climate 
regime.   
The Copenhagen Accord 
Besides the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, discussions that formed the Copenhagen 
Accord at COP15 showcased similar dynamics of interdependency between China and 
the United States and the critical influence of domestic politics. At the beginning of the 
Copenhagen conference, both nations proposed voluntary emissions targets, which set a 
hopeful and optimistic tone for COP15. China committed to lowering emissions intensity 
by 40 to 45 percent below 2005 levels before 2020.144 President Hu promoted three key 
climate negotiations and nations should not expect large advancements of climate policy through 
multilateral cooperation. 
143 Hovie, Skodvin, and Adresen, pg. 4. 
144 The International Energy Agency criticized China’s targets for being too lax, finding that China could 
reach their targets operating business as usual. Others have argued that these emissions projections include 
China’s domestic climate policies in the business as usual case and do not give China enough credit for 
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guiding principles in taking collective climate action: 1) fulfilling common but 
differentiated responsibilities, 2) “achieving mutual benefit and win-win outcomes” 
through international climate efforts, and 3) promoting common economic 
development.145 The United States announced its goal of reducing emissions within a 
range of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83 percent by 2050.146 With specific 
numbers on the table, climate negotiators had high hopes for COP15 in defining clear 
emissions targets. However, increased turbulence and uncertainty within the U.S. 
domestic landscape and China’s uncooperative behavior at COP15 led to a weak climate 
agreement.  
Despite the attendance of over a hundred world leaders in Copenhagen, the 
Accord largely depended upon President Obama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to 
broker a climate deal, illustrating Sino-U.S. policy interdependence and elevating both 
nations’ role in collective climate action.147 Compared to the political leadership involved 
during the Kyoto negotiations, a different U.S. leader, President Obama, worked with the 
current abatement efforts. See Lisa Friedman, “China, U.S. Give Copenhagen Negotiators Some Targets,” 
The New York Times, November 30, 2009, accessed on April 19, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/11/30/30climatewire-china-us-give-copenhagen-negotiators-some-ta-
73618.html?pagewanted=all 
145 Hu Jintao, Speech on Climate, September 22, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23hu.text.html. 
146 The U.S. target aligned with goals set in the 2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act, though this 
legislation remained stalled in Senate until 2010 and ultimately did not pass through Senate. Senator James 
Inhofe (R-OK), a known climate change skeptic, saw the U.S. target as overly ambitious and reaffirmed 
Senate’s historical opinion that “unilateral action by the United States is unacceptable, because it will harm 
[the U.S.] economy and have virtually no effect on climate change.” Congress held similar views on 
climate policy, but the change in presidential leadership shifted U.S. policy preferences dramatically. See 
John Broder, “Obama to Go to Copenhagen with Emissions Target,” The New York Times, November 25, 
2009, accessed on April 19, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/us/politics/26climate.html?pagewanted=all. 
147 Anthony Faiola, Juliet Eilperin and John Pomfret, “Copenhagen Climate Deal Shows New World Order 
May Be Led by U.S., China,” The Washington Post, December 20, 2009. 
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same Chinese players present at Kyoto. While the Kyoto Protocol asked nothing of 
China, the nation’s rapid development and rise to power raised expectations at 
Copenhagen. President Obama came into Copenhagen pushing for legally binding 
emissions targets so long as developing nations agreed to equitable reduction goals. By 
proposing policy that ensures participation from developing nations, President Obama 
formed win-sets that can gain “ratification” from Level II players. Increased pressure 
from their American counterparts and higher expectations placed China on the defensive 
at COP15. 
Despite President Obama’s initial leadership, the resulting Copenhagen Accord 
laid out no mandatory mitigation targets. The Accord requires Annex I nations to self-
determine and announce national reduction targets for 2020 and asks Non-Annex I 
nations to submit action plans for reducing GHG emissions.148 The less-than-ambitious 
Accord showed the limitations of climate change cooperation in the multilateral setting. 
Both the U.S. and China pointed at each other to explain the lack of collective action on 
climate change. While the U.S. showcased uncooperative conduct and withdrew from the 
Kyoto Protocol, China exhibited blocking behavior at COP15 and intended to minimize 
the chances of including emissions reduction commitments in a climate deal. Premier 
Wen Jiabo sent a vice foreign minister, He Yafei, to represent him at major meetings with 
other heads of states. Minister He had little decision-making power relative to the other 
participants at the meetings, but had the ability to block potentially harmful 
148 Peter Christoff, “Cold Climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP15,” Environmental 
Politics, July 2010, Vol. 19, No. 4, pg. 641. 
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agreements.149 Premier Wen’s absence from the final high-level negotiation sessions, 
including meetings with President Obama, exemplified China’s uncooperative and even 
insulting behavior.150 At a few points in the negotiation process, Minister He paused the 
meeting to call his superiors for consultation on particular components of the Accord, 
forcing some of the world’s most powerful heads of states to wait.151 Not only did China 
reject explicit emissions reduction targets, it denied other nations from including targets 
in the Accord to preemptively weaken the climate regulation regime.152 The U.S. 
delegation strongly advocated for increased international accountability and verification 
of emissions reductions in order to gain congressional support. China strongly opposed 
mandatory outside verification and bargained for voluntary compliance to maintain 
control on the information leaving the nation.153  
According to Putnam’s two-level game, states with centralized decision-makers 
on Level II have larger win-sets, which should lead to higher chances of pushing forward 
international agreements. China’s behavior seems incongruent with their ambitious 
domestic climate policies. However, China’s focus on economic growth, as emphasized 
by President Hu in his opening statement, and on maintaining close control of domestic 
processes made Chinese delegates uncooperative in the multilateral context. The CPC did 
not want to be held accountable by external parties or to increase the transparency of 
central government operations through international verification processes. Since China 
149 Christoff, pg. 639. 
150 Christoff, pg. 647. 
151 Mark Lynas, “How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the Room,” Guardian, 
December 22, 2009. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Faiola, Eilperin and Pomfret, “Copenhagen Climate Deal Shows New World Order May Be Led by 
U.S., China.”  
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already started to address its air quality issue domestically, the nation had little incentive 
to bind itself to unnecessary, external obligations. Even though China took unilateral 
actions to improve air quality, the nation saw little benefit and high risk to agreeing to 
mandatory emissions reduction targets or any external checks.  
While Level I players from the United States intended to advance ambitious 
climate policies at Copenhagen, the Great Recession exacerbated concerns about 
economic recovery and drew energy away from climate negotiations. The post-recession 
economy left climate policy relatively low on the U.S. policy agenda for the general 
public and for Congress.154 While President Obama deployed more cooperative 
approaches to climate negotiations and toward China compared to the Bush 
Administration, the financial crisis took saliency and political momentum away from the 
climate issue.155 Ratifying or supporting an international agreement that could hurt the 
job market was considered political suicide for U.S. politicians, especially when public 
opinion did not place a premium on environmental protection policy immediately during 
the Great Recession.  
The poor timing of congressional action on cap-and-trade legislation also posed a 
challenge for Level I players from the United States. President Obama faced uncertainty 
on how Senate will vote on the cap-and-trade bill that passed through the House of 
Representatives. As a result of such uncertainty, Level I negotiators risked proposing 
international climate policy too lax to push Congress for ambitious legislative action or 
developing an international agreement too aggressive for legislators to accept, which 
154 Christoff, pg. 654. 
155 Christoff, pg. 638. 
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would receive backlash and end in failure similar to the Kyoto Protocol.156Even though 
President Obama had a lot of momentum coming into COP15, uncertainty about the 
passage of ACES through the Senate and the recent recession made it difficult for the 
U.S. delegation to make hard promises on abatement.  
Domestic constraints and tensions within the Sino-U.S. relationship explicate the 
lackluster political outcomes from both Kyoto and Copenhagen. These combination of 
barriers showcased clear resemblance between challenges at Kyoto and Copenhagen. 
Both nations perceived payoff assumptions in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The impacts of 
lackluster U.S.-China leadership at Copenhagen resonated with those at Kyoto. At 
COP15, a climate leadership vacuum induced cautiousness from other nations instead of 
collective efforts to curb climate change.157  
These case studies analyze U.S.-China climate policy through the lens of 
Putnam’s two-level game. U.S. and Chinese behavior on the multilateral stage 
demonstrate that both nations prioritized economic growth over environmental due to the 
clarity of costs and diffuseness benefits associated with climate policy. The underlying 
geopolitical competition between the United States and China also motivated both 
nations to prioritize their economic strength over GHG emissions reductions during these 
multilateral negotiations. 158 Since multilateral climate policies depend on the two 
nations’ participation and leadership, the global climate regime remains weak. Outcomes 
156 Nigel Purvis and Andrew Stevenson, “U.S. Leadership in Copenhagen,” Resources for the Future, 
November 2009, pg. 1 – 2. 
157 Christoff, pg. 653 – 654. 
158 Christoff, pg. 644. 
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from the Kyoto and Copenhagen conferences do not legally bind either nation from 
abatement and correlate with the Nash Equilibrium in the Prisoner’s Dilemma model.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
Bilateral Collaboration on Climate Change 
 
 
In Putnam’s two-level game, Putnam does not explicitly differentiate between 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations. However, policy outcomes involving China and 
the United States on the multilateral stage diverges greatly from those on the bilateral 
level. The United States and China have engaged in numerous bilateral programs to 
promote climate change adaptation and mitigation, which starkly contrasts with the 
stalemate during multilateral climate talks. The friendlier, more collaborative face of the 
U.S.-China relationship reveals itself in the bilateral context far more than in a 
multilateral environment. Policy outcomes on the bilateral level suggest perceived 
payoffs associated with the Coordination Game, instead of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Compared to multilateral agreements, bilateral negotiations allow for more overlapping 
win-sets on specific policy areas and drastically reduce the risk of free-riding. More 
recently, executive political leadership of both nations have aligned on climate policy 
goals and developed closer bilateral ties. Bilateral collaboration serves as a politically 
expedient policy vehicle to tackle climate change. In pursuing bilateral policies, 
unintended consequences have resulted, including trade disputes and the lack of follow 
through on joint programs. With these barriers to collaboration in mind, effective U.S.-
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China climate collaboration can positively impact their bilateral relationship and 
influence multilateral climate agreements.  
U.S.-China Joint Initiatives 
Prior to 2009, China and the United States engaged in a number of small 
partnerships to forward mutual energy interests and to reduce GHG emissions. For 
instance, the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development launched in 1997 and 
provided a platform to advance sustainable development and to cooperate on urban air 
quality, renewable energy, and rural electrification.159 The United States and China 
created the Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework (TYF) in 2008 
during an annual Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) meeting. The TYF established five 
joint task forces to share best practices and foster innovation regarding clean energy, 
energy efficiency, water quality, air pollution, and the transportation sector. 160,161 These 
forms of collaboration grew in size and ambitions under President Obama and President 
Xi’s leadership. 
When President Obama came into office, the number of joint climate programs 
with China increased exponentially; 2009 marked the creation of the largest number of 
159 Joanna Lewis, “The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and 
Multilateral Relationship,” China Environment Series, No. 11, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, December 2010, pg 17. 
160 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Ten-Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and 
Environment.” 
161 President Bush did not actively support climate policies at home and viewed China more as an adversary 
than friend. President Bush launched the SED with President Hu in 2006 to promote the economic 
development of both nations, complementing his policy agenda on economic growth and highlighting the 
economic interdependency between the two nations. The SED created a forum for cabinet-level officials 
from both nations to forward overlapping economic interests, which included addressing climate change 
and both nations’ energy systems, and led to the creation of the TYF. See Secretary Henry Paulson Jr., 
“Meeting the Challenge: A Partnership on Energy and the Environment,” Embassy of the United States to 
China, April 3, 2008. 
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joint climate and energy initiatives in Sino-U.S. history. President Obama expanded the 
SED into the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in 2009 and 
drastically grew the breadth of bilateral cooperation with China. At these S&ED 
meetings, China and the United States developed a range of cross-agency programs 
designed to foster partnership in tackling climate and energy issues. The 2009 
Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy, 
and the Environment reaffirmed mutual environmental goals between the U.S. 
Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of State, and China’s NRDC. The EPA 
partnered with the NRDC in a five-year agreement to address climate adaptation in the 
Memorandum of Cooperation to Build Capacity to Address Climate Change. Additional 
examples of U.S.-China bilateral climate collaboration developed in 2009 and 2010 
include the Renewable Energy Partnership, the Clean Energy Research Center, the 
Energy Cooperation Program, and the Renewable Energy Forums. 162 These joint 
initiatives promote knowledge and resource sharing among various U.S. and Chinese 
agencies to accelerate renewable energy deployment and GHG emissions reductions. 
President Xi renewed the momentum for U.S.-China collaboration once he 
succeeded President Hu. According to Orville Schell, the director of the Center on U.S.-
China Relations at the Asia Society, “Xi Jinping is a very tough, muscular, nationalist 
leader whose toolbox is taken from earlier Mao periods.”163 President Xi, the son of a 
revolutionary hero, exhibits more bold and confident characteristics compared to the 
162 Lewis, “The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change,” pg 17. 
163 James West, “Here’s Why China Cares More about Climate Change Than Congress Does,” Mother 
Jones, November 13, 2014, accessed on March 20, 2015, 
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/11/china-obama-climate-deal-pollution-crisis-politics. 
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formal and reserved Hu Jintao. In Xi Jinping’s speech after his leadership appointment, 
he stated:  
[The Party has the responsibility] to unite and lead people of the entire party… 
while accepting the baton of history and continuing to work for realizing the great 
revival of the Chinese nation in order to let the Chinese nation stand more firmly 
and powerfully among all nations around the world and make a greater 
contribution to mankind.164  
 
This statement captures his ambitious policy agenda and his desire to realize the Chinese 
Dream, which includes empowering the Chinese people with higher standards of living 
and expanding China’s role as a global superpower. President Xi views climate 
leadership as a pathway toward both components of the Chinese Dream. In 2013, 
President Xi and President Obama set up the U.S-China Working Group on Climate 
Change, which focuses on five initiatives: 1) raising fuel efficiency standards to reduce 
heavy duty truck emissions, 2) developing carbon capture technologies, 3) increasing 
energy efficiency in buildings, 4) improving audit and reporting for GHG emissions, and 
5) promoting smart grid deployment.165 Notably, this bilateral initiative includes 
cooperation on improving reporting processes, even though the two nations disagreed on 
the international accountability and voluntary clause at Copenhagen. These initiatives 
exhibit the expediency of bilateral engagements as a policy tool for climate action. 
Involving two nations has relatively lower transactions costs and allow for both players to 
retain more control over shaping the policies. 
In June 2013, President Obama and President Xi agreed to collaborate on phasing 
out the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in order to decrease 
164 President Xi Jinping, Full Text of Speech by New Communist Party General Secretary. 
165 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group Fact Sheet,” July 10, 2013. 
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ozone depletion and to reduce the impacts of climate change.166 This agreement uses the 
framework and guidelines presented in the Montreal Protocol, which has been signed by 
every country and successfully helped society phase out other ozone-depleting 
substances.167 President Obama and President Xi hope that U.S.-China joint leadership in 
reducing HFC emissions can result in large-scale multilateral efforts to phase out HFCs 
from the environment. The United States and China can deploy a similar leadership 
strategy for future multilateral negotiations and use bilateral collaboration as the first step 
to reach collective action in reducing other GHG emissions. Granted, HFCs only 
represent a small portion of GHGs with clear harms on the environment and its phase-
down presents less risk in impacting the economy compared to reductions in more 
prevalent pollutants. Developing bilateral and multilateral agreements to reduce CO2 or 
other common pollutants have proven to be far more politically sensitive and difficult.  
At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2014, 
President Obama and President Xi announced a bilateral climate deal targeted toward 
GHG emissions reduction. Shifting national interests and more environmentally-focused 
political leaders helped broker this deal, alongside months of negotiation prior to 
APEC.168 In this climate deal, the United States pledges to reduce emissions by 26 to 28 
166 U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, “United States and China Agree to Work Together on 
Phase Down of HFCs,” June 8, 2013. 
167 Ibid. 
168 President Obama sent a formal proposal to President Xi in the spring of 2014 to set joint reduction 
targets. Climate negotiations developed at the September 2014 UN climate summit in New York, when 
President Obama met with Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, who focuses on climate and energy issues. In 
October, senior presidential advisor John Podesta travelled to Beijing to continue negotiations, which were 
finalized during President Obama’s visit to China for APEC. See David Jackson, “Obama Clears the Air on 
Climate Change Deal with China,” USA Today, November 12, 2014, accessed on March 24, 2015, 
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percent below 2005 levels by 2025.169 Hitting the new climate deal target means the 
United States needs to speed up emission reductions by two-fold starting in 2020.170 
China agreed to reach its CO2 emissions peak by 2030 and to grow renewable sources to 
at least 20 percent of the nation’s energy mix.171 Currently, about 10 percent of China’s 
energy comes from renewable sources.172 China will need to add 800 to 1,000 gigawatts 
of capacity from renewable sources.173  
On a bilateral level, China and the United States exhibited behaviors suggesting 
that decision-makers subscribed to payoffs from the Coordination Game instead of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The players perceived higher payoffs from bilateral abatement 
compared to asymmetrical abatement. The opposite occurred during multilateral 
negotiations, which often ended in stalemate and ineffective policy outcomes. As the 
certainty of climate change and its negative impacts increase, these nations have 
increased incentives to take part in climate mitigation efforts to avoid climate 
catastrophe.  
The political will of executive leaders, changing public preferences, and the lower 
risk of free-riding also explain why bilateral agreements seem more politically expedient 
than multilateral ones. The timing and pace of development in bilateral programs since 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/12/obama-china-xi-jinping-climate-change-
agreement-coal/18901537/. 
169 U.S White House Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change,” 
November 11, 2014. 
170 The Economist, “Dealing with Denial,” November 15, 2014, accessed on March 24, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21632508-americas-concessions-are-more-real-chinas-
dealing-denial. 
171 U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change.”  
172 Edward Wong, “China’s Climate Change Plan Raises Questions,” New York Times, November 12, 2014, 
accessed on March 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/world/asia/climate-change-china-xi-
jinping-obama-apec.html?_r=2. 
173 Ibid. 
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2009 highlight the importance of presidential leadership. President Obama brought the 
issue of climate change and engagement with China to the forefront of the national 
agenda. Even though domestic politics barred Congress from enacting legislation to 
address climate issues, President Obama used his executive powers to push forward 
bilateral agreements, acting with less caution and more ambition in his second term. 
Partnering directly with China and setting joint emissions reduction goals make it harder 
for future administrations to unravel the climate deal for the sake of maintaining political 
capital and stable foreign relations.174 This safety mechanism allows President Obama to 
leave a climate legacy. President Xi’s leadership also advanced climate policy. The 
ambitious leader wants to present China and the United States as equal partners and assert 
a renewed and revitalized image of China. As a nation that feels historically victimized 
by the West, partnering on climate policies symbolizes equalization between China and 
the United States. At the close of the APEC Summit, President Xi stated that “President 
Obama and I believe that when China and the United States work together, we can 
become an anchor of world stability and a propeller of world peace.”175 This statement 
illustrates China’s national interest of becoming the next global superpower, but also 
highlights the role of U.S. partnership in supporting China’s rise and the impact made by 
the two nations. His aspirations for China as a global superpower—a term no longer 
strictly characterized by economic strength, but also political influence—motivated 
President Xi to push forward a historical climate agreement with the United States. 
174 Bader, pg. 62. 
175 Pauhala, “The APEC Summit Closes with a ‘Historic’ Climate Deal.”  
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Public preferences in both nations demanded increased government action on 
climate change and air pollution. As previously discussed in Chapter Three, 69 percent of 
Americans surveyed in 2010 believed that the United States should make a “large or 
medium-scale effort to reduce global warming even if it incurs large or moderate 
economic costs.”176 The American public’s concern toward climate change grew 
dramatically as the U.S. economy recovered after 2008.177 China’s annual upsurge in 
environmental protests and increased international press coverage of poor environmental 
conditions further motivated President Xi to forward climate action. Both executive 
leaders saw clear benefits in crafting this climate deal, including improving bilateral 
relationships, appeasing public desires for government action on climate change, and 
leaving a presidential legacy.  
Negotiations limited to two nations eliminate the free-rider effect that plagues 
multilateral agreements, especially in repeated games when both sides know they will 
come into contact again. This mechanism of high-certainty in repeated encounters 
encourages both countries to comply with bilateral agreements and are therefore more 
likely to agree to terms in the first place. The United States and China have it in their best 
interest to hold each other accountable once they agree on a deal to avoid asymmetrical 
abatement. The amount of media and political attention this climate deal has received, in 
addition to the likelihood of future interactions between the two nations, have created a 
176 Yale Project on Climate Change and Communication, “American Opinion on Climate Change Warms 
Up.”  
177 The growing prevalence of extreme weather events around the world, including Hurricane Sandy in 
2012 and the current drought in California, increased the saliency of climate issues. See Joe Romm, 
“Global Warming Linked to More Extreme Weather and Weaker Jet Stream,” Think Progress, January 15, 
2015, accessed on April 21, 2015, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/01/15/3612054/global-warming-
extreme-weather/. 
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high stakes situation to deter defection. If either nation fails to deliver on their promises, 
they will suffer the loss of political capital abroad and tarnish the growing trust between 
the two nations. Even if the deal holds no legal weight, each nation has an interest in 
meeting emissions reduction goals and perceives higher payoffs from investing in 
abatement. Changed public preferences, pro-climate policy leaders, and the prospects of 
avoiding climate catastrophe cumulate into these higher payoff assumptions, especially 
when both nations act together. Partnership between these global leaders are not only 
necessary to effectively curbing GHG emissions, U.S.-China collaboration can also lead 
to spillover effects on the multilateral stage and encourage more nations to abate.  
Challenges & Drawbacks of Bilateral Collaboration 
Once Level I players agree on a deal, Putnam emphasizes the need for domestic 
political support to endorse and implement any international agreement. While the 
climate deal does not mandate formal ratification, its success hinges on congressional 
actions. Since the executive branch perceives different risks and benefits compared to 
Congress, these two groups hold opposing views on climate action. Many Republican 
leaders criticized the agreement for giving China too many concessions and 
disproportionately distributing cost burdens, which can harm U.S. growth. House Speaker 
John Boehner (R-OH) believes that the climate deal “is yet another sign that the President 
intends to double down on his job-crushing policies no matter how devastating the impact 
for America’s heartland and the country as a whole.” 178 Senate Majority leader, Mitch 
McConnell (R-KY), expressed distress in requiring “the Chinese to do nothing at all for 
178 Jackson, “Obama Clears the Air on Climate Change Deal with China.” 
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16 years, while these carbon emission regulations [create] havoc in [his] state and other 
states across the country.”179 Senator McConnell represents a coal-dependent state and 
ran on the platform against the administration’s “war on coal.” He has clear incentives to 
speak out against the climate deal that can harm his constituents. This narrative drives the 
debate in Congress on how to block federal agencies from acting on certain executive 
orders. While the 2014 climate deal is not legally binding, the lack of support from Level 
II actors poses many challenges in reaching U.S. emissions targets. Congress has 
threatened to delegitimize President Obama’s executive powers through exercising the 
power of the purse and blocking the enforcement of federal emissions regulations. The 
Republican Congress can hinder the EPA’s ability to regulate GHGs effectively through 
funding cuts and set back the nation’s ability to reach these ambitious targets.  
While some Republican Party leaders claim the climate deal gives China a free 
pass until 2030, the climate agreement actually necessitates China to implement 
aggressive policies to peak on carbon emissions by 2030, considering their movement 
along the development curve. China has already taken many unilateral steps to curb inner 
city pollution and decrease emissions. A 2014 study by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology found that Chinese emissions can peak between 2025 and 2035 only if the 
nation continued to implement stringent emissions reduction measures.180 The emission 
goals between U.S. and China objectively differ because they take the development 
179 Ed O’Keefe, David Nakamura and Steven Mufson, “GOP Congressional Leaders Denounce U.S. –
China Deal on Climate Change,” The Washington Post, November 12, 2014, accessed on April 21, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gop-congressional-leaders-denounce-us-china-deal-on-climate-
change/2014/11/12/ff2b84e0-6a8d-11e4-a31c-77759fc1eacc_story.html. 
180 Wong, “China’s Climate Change Plan Raises Questions.”  
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context of each nation into consideration and try to keep cost burdens equitable. China’s 
economic prosperity is far more dependent on carbon-intensive processes compared to 
that of the United States. 181 The contradiction between Republican rhetoric and the 
reality of the climate deal showcase how politically charged and challenging bilateral 
cooperation can be in a hostile domestic political environment. In contrast to their 
Republican counterparts, Democratic leadership has largely supported the agreement and 
considered it the right start to taking climate action. However, Republicans won a 
majority in both houses of Congress in 2014 and can drive most of the policy 
conversations on the Hill. Opposing reactions to the climate deal reflect the persistent 
partisan divide on the climate issue. U.S. political institutions set intentionally high 
barriers for authorizing legislation and essentially mandate compromise across party 
lines. However, the Founding Fathers did not anticipate this degree of partisanship in 
Congress, which has revealed drawbacks and social inefficiencies within the U.S. 
political system. Despite the breakthrough of the climate deal between the United States 
and China, Level II actors and domestic politics still present a large barrier to achieving 
emissions targets. Unlike these partisan conflicts in the United States, China’s one-party 
state allows the CPC to dictate policies and bilateral agreements with little public 
criticism from party leaders.  
Besides challenges facing the most recent climate deal, the lattice of bilateral 
initiatives across U.S. and Chinese agencies encounter other barriers to effective 
181 Bob Sussman, “The U.S.-China Climate Deal: Not a Free Ride for the Chinese,” The Brookings 
Institute, November 25, 2014, accessed on April 19, 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2014/11/25-us-china-climate-deal-sussman. 
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implementation, including the lack of funding or follow-through and residual mutual 
distrust perpetuated by confrontational competition. 182 Both the U.S.-China Clean 
Energy Center and the Renewable Energy Partnership created in 2009 used funds from 
existing sources with no clear additional forms of financial support.183 In other words, 
more programs are pulling from the same pool of funding, which is not financially 
sustainable. These barriers have hindered successful knowledge sharing for renewable 
energy development and GHG emissions reductions. In some cases, the down-sizing or 
cancellation of certain partnerships by the United States have increased distrust in the 
relationship and generated reluctance to develop future climate partnerships.184 These 
implementation issues highlight the impact of political institutions on international 
policies. Even though the executive branch pursued certain cooperative initiatives, the 
lack of funding appropriated by Congress for these programs can render them ineffective 
and harm the U.S.-China relationship.  
 Adversarial trade practices in the renewable energy industry have grown distrust 
and additional barriers to cooperation on clean energy deployment. While both nations 
coordinate on renewable energy research and development, they have fought over unfair 
competition within the industry. China’s state-sponsored enterprises produced solar 
panels and exported them to the U.S. at lower-than-cost prices, which drove many 
American firms into bankruptcy and made it difficult for the American manufacturing 
industry to compete. In June 2014, the U.S. Commerce Department found that Chinese 
182 Lewis, “The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change ,” pg. 17 – 18. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
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solar panel producers benefited unfairly from government subsidies and were dumping 
solar panels into the U.S. market. 185,186 The Commerce Department set duties on Chinese 
solar panel imports from 11 percent to 55 percent in attempts to increase the fairness of 
international trade.187 These tariffs may threaten the development of the renewable 
energy sector, since they drive up the price of solar panels for American consumers and 
companies. Increased prices lowers solar adoption rates and hinders the climate 
mitigation agenda. Similar trade tensions occurred regarding the wind turbine industry. 
Before 2009, China only allowed domestic wind turbine installations that utilized largely 
locally manufactured parts, which restricted many foreign firms from competing in the 
growing Chinese market.188 China opened up the wind turbine market to U.S. 
manufacturers after the United States filed a World Trade Organization dispute in 2010 
against unfair government subsidization within the industry.189 Trade disputes in both the 
solar and wind industry highlight the nature of the Sino-U.S. relationship as cooperative 
competitors. Both nations predict net benefit from engaging in bilateral collaboration on 
climate action, but they should recognize how a hostile domestic environment and 
adversarial competition could hinder trust-building and block the implementation of 
bilateral climate initiatives.  
185 Diane Cardwell and Keith Bradsher, “Solar Industry Is Rebalanced by U.S. Pressure on China,” The 
New York Times, July 25, 2014, accessed on February 11, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/business/energy-environment/solar-industry-is-rebalanced-by-us-
pressure-on-china.html?_r=0. 
186 Besides taking issue with the dumping of Chinese solar panels, the United States also criticizes China 
for their unfair, uncompetitive monetary policy that devalues the RMB in favor of China’s export-driven 
economy.  
187 Cardwell and Bradsher, “Solar Industry Is Rebalanced by U.S. Pressure on China.”  
188 Lewis, “The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change,” pg. 18. 
189 Ibid. 
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Why Sino-U.S. Climate Collaboration Matters 
Even considering the political restraints and barriers facing bilateral cooperation, 
President Obama and President Xi’s commitment to collaborating on climate action 
marks a historical turning point in climate policy and has substantial, tactical benefits on 
U.S.-China relations and the multilateral climate regime. China and the United States 
have conflicted and competed on many social, political, and economic issues, which 
created an unlikely environment for strong bilateral Sino-U.S. relations.190 Climate 
collaboration serves as a platform for trust building and can lay the foundation for future 
cooperation on other overlapping interests. Wang Tao, a scholar at the Carnegie-
Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, believes that “successful collaboration on energy and 
climate matters may hold the key to unlocking the tight knot in wider U.S.-China 
diplomatic relations.”191 Working together on overlapping interests, while holding off on 
more sensitive topics like Taiwan, human rights violations, and trade agreements, 192 can 
build mutual assurance and increases the likelihood of successful bilateral engagements 
in the future.  
Not only does the climate deal have immense consequences on the Sino-U.S. 
relationship, the leadership shown by both nations affects the multilateral landscape. 
During these recent climate negotiations, Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized the 
impact that U.S. and Chinese leadership will have on shaping a global climate agreement: 
190 Pauhala, “The APEC Summit Closes with a ‘Historic’ Climate Deal.”  
191 Wang Tao, “Energy and Climate Collaboration Key to U.S.-China Relations?” The Diplomat, August 8, 
2014, accessed on April 18, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/energy-and-climate-collaboration-key-
to-u-s-china-relations/. 
192 The United States is actively engaged in negotiations about the Trans Pacific Partnership, which 
excludes China, and has created additional tensions between the two nations.  
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“I want to underscore that when [China and the United States] make a decision...it ripples 
beyond our borders.”193 Increased bilateral action can influence multilateral action. The 
high stakes collaboration between the United States and China symbolize the coming 
together of developed and developing nations to work on climate change policy. With 
their participation, cooperation, and leadership, other nations have the confidence to 
advance more climate policies and develop a stronger global climate regime.  
At COP20 in Lima, international negotiators rode the momentum from the recent 
U.S.-China climate deal and agreed to shift away from characterizing nations as either 
developed or developing in future climate talks when determining abatement 
responsibilities.194 The Lima Call for Climate Action outlined that national reduction 
goals should be based on “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities in light of different national circumstances,” including the nation’s capacity 
and resources available to implement stringent goals.195 Nations should share 
responsibilities for climate mitigation, but these responsibilities do not depend strictly on 
Annex I categorizations as they had before. 20 years after drafting the Kyoto Protocol, 
193 Suzanne Goldenberg, “U.S. and China to Extend Cooperation in Effort to Curb Climate Change,” The 
Guardian, July 10, 2013, accessed on March 19, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jul/10/america-china-cooperation-reduce-climate-change. 
194 Other notable successes at Lima include fundraising for the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a financial 
resource to transfer capital from developed to developing nations for climate mitigation and adaptation 
programs. The GCF received support from 19 nations, including the United States, Australia, Belgium, and 
Peru. Financial pledges exceeded the initial target of $10 billion. See Gwynne Taraska and Jesse Vogel, 
“Outcomes of the Lima Climate Negotiations: Essential Steps Toward an International Climate 
Agreement,” American Progress, December 18, 2014, accessed on March 20, 2015, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/12/18/103534/outcomes-of-the-lima-climate-
negotiations-essential-steps-toward-an-international-climate-agreement/.  
195 Michael Jacobs, “Lima Deal Represents a Fundamental Change in Global Climate Regime,” The 
Guardian, December 15, 2014, accessed on April 16, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec/15/lima-deal-represents-a-fundamental-change-in-
global-climate-regime. 
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developing nations like China and India look very different from their old selves. 
According to Christiana Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, this shift in 
perspective “is a very important breakthrough that [will open] the way [toward] a Paris 
agreement” at COP21 in 2015.196 Using the guidelines in the Call for Climate Action, 
countries agreed to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 
or post-2020 emissions reduction goals, in preparation for COP21.197 Environmentalists 
criticized Lima outcomes for allowing nations to decide their own emissions reduction 
targets. However, these stakeholders focused on unrealistic expectations of setting 
stringent standards immediately and did not acknowledge the long-term impact of such a 
narrative shift.198 The Call for Action symbolically ends the division between developed 
and developing nations that has historically created stalemates in past multilateral climate 
negotiations. Removing the usual divide between developed and developing nations 
could allow additional nations to perceive higher payoffs from collective action than 
payoffs from non-abatement or asymmetrical abatement on the multilateral level. This 
new approach to multilateral climate agreements can ameliorate past tensions between 
the United States and China, and other developed and developing nations. While one 
cannot attribute the advancements at Lima completely to the 2014 Sino-U.S. climate deal, 
196 Matt McGrath, “UN Climate Deal in Peru Ends North-South Split,” BBC, December 14, 2014, accessed 
on April 15, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30473085. 
197 In March 2015, the United States submitted its INDCs and plan to reach emissions reduction 
commitments through cutting vehicle emissions, decarbonizing the energy industry, increasing energy 
efficiency, and phasing out HFCs. See David Waskow and Kristin Meek, “U.S. Climate Commitment 
Should Spur Other Countries to Act,” World Resources Institute, April 1, 2015, accessed April 16, 2015, 
http://wri.org/blog/2015/04/us-climate-commitment-should-spur-other-countries-act. 
198 Robert Stavins, “Assessing the Outcome of the Lima Climate Talks,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, December 14, 2014, accessed on April 15, 2015, 
http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2014/12/14/assessing-the-outcome-of-the-lima-climate-talks/. 
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the bilateral agreement surely gave international negotiators the confidence and 
encouragement to push the boundaries and status quo of multilateral climate talks.  
Until recently, other nations had little confidence in the United States or China for 
committing to reduction targets. Rhetoric from President Xi and President Obama 
confirm U.S.-China climate leadership moving forward. Leaders from both sides have 
expressed explicit interest in leading multilateral climate negotiations in Paris this winter. 
In the Joint Press Conference after the climate deal announcement, President Obama 
affirmed the two nations’ “special responsibility to lead the global effort against climate 
change,” since the two countries have “the world’s two largest economies, energy 
consumers and emitters of greenhouse gases.”199 President Xi announced that the two 
leaders “agreed to make sure that international climate change negotiations will reach an 
agreement as scheduled at the Paris conference in 2015, and [they] agreed to deepen 
practical cooperation on clean energy, environment protection, and other areas.”200 These 
statements express the Chinese and U.S. commitment to taking coordinated leadership on 
climate action. Notably, the United States will remain constrained by a Republican 
Senate, which suggests that Level I players can only agree to a nonbinding international 
accord instead of a treaty at COP21. This restriction continues to illustrate the role of 
Level II players and the need to depolarize the increasingly partisan divide over climate 
policies in the United States. In the meantime, the executive leadership in both the United 
199 U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi 
Jinping in Joint Press Conference,” White House, November 12, 2014, accessed on February 14, 2015, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-
jinping-joint-press-conference. 
200 Ibid. 
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States and China, driven by a more environmentally-conscious public, will endeavor to 
lead a new chapter in the global climate regime.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
As anthropogenic emissions rise at an unsustainable rate, the Earth’s temperature 
increases and the impacts of climate change manifest through rising sea levels and 
extreme weather events. The risks of inaction have surmounted and push nations toward 
unilateral and collective action. China and the United States hold unique positions to lead 
the developed and developing world in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Their 
partnership and lack thereof on the bilateral and multilateral scale have immense 
influence on the future of the global climate regime. U.S.-China inaction blocks and 
deters other nations from engaging in an effective multilateral agreement, while U.S.-
China climate leadership can shift perceptions around the benefits of cooperative climate 
action and create a ripple effect that encourages other nations to invest in abatement.  
Sino-U.S. interactions in climate policy reflect the broader relationship between 
the two nations: they have an ambiguously interdependent relationship with fluctuating 
perceptions of benefit and harm, antagonism and friendship. China and the United States 
experienced adversarial encounters in the multilateral context and far friendlier 
exchanges on the bilateral level. Putnam’s two-level game and different expectations of 
costs and benefits by policymakers reveal why the Sino-U.S. relationship resembled the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix on the multilateral scale and the Coordination Game 
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payoff matrix in the bilateral context. Assumptions around the clear costs of free-riders 
and asymmetrical abatement motivated such blocking behavior during the Kyoto and 
Copenhagen negotiations. Changes in executive leadership and their policy preferences 
since 2009 dramatically increased opportunities for climate diplomacy, especially on the 
bilateral level, and explain the increase in joint government programs. While bilateral 
negotiations are more politically expedient among Level I actors, pushback from Level II 
actors within the United States emphasize the binding influence that domestic politics and 
the political institution have on international climate policy. The cost-benefit matrix 
captures a high-level view of these complex dynamics between the United States and 
China. 
Moving forward, the United States and China should focus on the effective 
implementation of domestic emissions reduction programs in order to reach their 
abatement goals and to give other nations the confidence to take collective action. Both 
nations face implementation barriers. In the United States, the executive branch must 
wrestle with an uncooperative and hostile Congress. China’s one-party system excuses 
the CPC from these issues, and the Party prioritized environmental protection in its policy 
agenda. Despite the national focus on improving China’s environment, the 
implementation of emissions reduction policies remains weak due to the principal-agent 
issue and the misalignment of central versus local incentives. The Party will struggle to 
implement outcome-driven policies. Misaligned incentives and the principal-agent 
problem have plagued the Chinese bureaucracy, leading to a disproportionate focus on 
policy inputs over outcomes. In spite of these challenges, the recent bilateral agreement 
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encourages both nations to hold one another accountable and to support each other in 
their abatement targets, since evenly paced abatement benefits both nations. The 
implementation process presents an additional opportunity to build mutual trust and to 
strengthen the Sino-U.S. relationship.  
Sino-U.S. climate collaboration plays a critical role in moving the needle on 
climate mitigation and adaptation. Judging by the constructive outcomes from the Lima 
conference, China and the United States can foster significant advancements in the global 
climate regime during COP21. As Sino-U.S. climate collaboration matures, nations 
around the world will begin to change their traditional perceptions around the costs and 
benefits of abatement. In an optimal scenario, increased engagement and cooperation 
between the United States and China translate into stronger multilateral action and more 
stringent emissions reduction policies that contribute to slowing the rise of global 
temperatures to below 2 degrees Celsius. Through this climate leadership mechanism, 
nations can collectively conserve the Earth’s resources, protect the Planet’s atmosphere, 
and invest in the livelihood of future generations.  
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“While we may not live to see the full realization of our ambition, we will 
have the satisfaction of knowing that the world we leave our children will be 
better off for what we did.” 
 
- Barack Obama, President of the United States (2008 – 2016) 
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